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 Abstract  
  
The main aim of this thesis is to discern the activism of the European Parliament 
Members (MEPs) representing the Baltic states, with a secondary aim to find out the 
differences of activism between European Union founding states and Central-Eastern 
European countries that joined the union in 2004. The argumentation for the research 
stems from finding out, which of the MEPs representing any of the Baltic states can be 
considered the most active, as a common misconception in modern Europe is that MEPs 
are inactive in their day-to-day duties in the European Parliament. Additionally, the 
secondary aim attempts at comparing the aforementioned country groups to see whether 
or not countries with greater experience in the union are more active than relative 
newcomers. 
The research utilizes 9 different parameters that depict parliamentary activities in 
the EP by which activism of each MEP is measured in this research. To display the 
activism of both countries and individual MEPs, a suite of methods is designed to discern 
the relevant results. The research includes the collection of required data on every MEP 
currently serving in the current European Parliament that is later used for necessary 
calculations. The results for both the analysis of countries and Baltic MEPs are gathered 
in several graphs and relevant conclusions are drawn from them. Based on the available 
results, the Baltic MEPs are further classified into two divisions of parliamentary activities 
inspired by Bíró-Nagy (2016). 
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Introduction  
Nowadays the European Parliament plays a crucial role in every EU country, 
because the laws that are adopted there are implemented in each member state. Every 
EU member state has their representatives in the European Parliament, which are elected 
considering degressive proportionality criteria, which means that EU member states with 
lower population size are allocated with more seats than those that have larger 
populations. Different policies and rules are made in the European Parliament that in 
many instances are not always in favor of the member state. Because of this reason every 
EU member state has chosen certain politicians through the process of a national level 
elections to implement and reject certain policies that are important for the member state 
in the European Parliament. The main aim of Members of European Parliament (MEPs) 
is to represent their constituency in the EP. MEPs overall performance in the EP stems 
from the results of parliamentarian activities in the EP. MEPs that show higher results in 
parliamentarian activities have a better opportunity to represent their member states’ 
interests in the EP, but the EP elections do not always provide the information to voters 
about the EU politics and does not clarify the future development of the EU (Scully, 
Farrell 2003:270). 
 The region chosen for the research are the Baltic states. The Baltic states are 
chosen due to several reasons, by the main reason being the fact that by several scholars 
the Baltic states are being grouped together with other Eastern and Central European 
(CEE) countries, while geographically Baltic states are located in the Northern Europe 
as according to the UN (Bochasler 2005, Nyćkowiak 2014, Grotz and Weber 2012). The 
Baltic states themselves would rather nowadays be associated with the Northern Europe 
both geographically and geopolitically, nevertheless being a part of the Soviet Union and 
having socialist structure for about 50 years cannot be forgotten (Pyzik 2014). When the 
Baltic states where still a part of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union positioned them as 
having a better life than people in all other Sovietized countries. Most of the facts that 
were complementing this idea were pure propaganda of the Soviet Union (Antonevics 
2018). Baltic states have been viewed as a separate union from all the other former 
Eastern Bloc countries, to which nowadays we refer as Central European countries. In 
this research the Baltic states are compared to the Central and Eastern European countries 
that joined the EU in 2004. The goal for this research is to find out are there in terms of 
the MEPs parliamentary activism visible differences or the patterns for the former 
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Eastern bloc countries are similar to each other when it comes to the MEPs activism in 
the EP. 
Furthermore regarding the MEPs activism in the EP the CEE countries will be compared 
with the 6 founding states of the EU in order to find out do the MEPs in the EP all share 
similar levels of activism in different parameters, or the two groups of countries’ MEPs 
show remarkable differences in the officially documented parliamentary activities.  
The main aim of this research is to compare the activism of MEPs of all three 
Baltic states in the European Parliament. By activism is meant professional political 
activities of MEPs in the EP (Drozd 2015:229-230). In order to compare the Baltic states 
MEPs activism there is brought out comparison of parliamentary activities of MEPs by 
calculating the EU average for MEPs that represent Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) that joined the EU in 2004 (among them 3 Baltic states) and Western 
European countries, which includes the 6 founding member states of the European 
Communities (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Western 
Germany). The goal of this comparison is to acknowledge the differences in the voting 
and political behavior between the two blocks of European countries. Afterwards there 
is examined the comparison of the Baltic states and other CEE countries that joined the 
EU in 2004 in order to find out do the three Baltic countries share similar levels of 
activism as the CEE countries in different parameters, or the Baltic states should be taken 
as a separate case and the results of activism measurement are vastly different. The final 
comparison is between the three Baltic states as based on the calculated EU average to 
find out which of the Baltic states in the overall is the most and least active based on the 
officially documented dataset of MEPs parliamentary activities. As the Baltic states is 
the main group of research for each member state there is brought out activism 
measurement of each MEP that represents the particular member state in order to find 
out the most active and the least active MEP of the Baltic states. In the European 
Parliament 6 MEPs represent Estonia, 8 MEPs represent Latvia and 11 MEPs represent 
Lithuania. All three Baltic states joined the EU in 2004.  
 The EU in 2004 accessed 10 countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For the purposes of 
this research there are chosen only the Central and Eastern European countries (The 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). 
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The division of these countries as Eastern European is derived from the Eastern Bloc, 
which after 1945 meant all the countries in Europe that where occupied by the Soviet 
army (Worldatlas 2018). Despite the fact that 5 of the Eastern European countries 
mentioned were officially independent from the Soviet Union, in all of these countries 
were adopted communist rule and therefore those were the satellite states of the Soviet 
Union. The Baltic states were in different position than the other 5 Eastern European 
countries due to annexation by the Soviet Union, which made the Baltic states a part of 
the Soviet Union.  
The 6 founding states of the EU are Belgium, Western Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The predecessors of the EU are the European Coal 
and Steel Community that was founded by the aforementioned six member states. Later 
in 1957 there was founded the European Economic Community and after that the 
European Atomic Energy Community. The main aim after the Second World war was to 
foster the economic cooperation and through trading of goods would be possible to make 
the countries interdependent, which would help to avoid conflict situations (European 
Commission 2018). For the purposes of the research are chosen particularly the 6 
founding states as the representative states of the Western Europe due to a simple reason 
– these were the first countries that constructed the EU as it is nowadays.  
Considering the differences experienced by the CEE and WE countries in the 
20th century, one could expect that the founding states would be more active in terms of 
parliamentary actions in the EP. The major factors for this line of thinking could be their 
experience in the EP and, as already described, their role in establishing the EU. 
However, such assertions cannot be automatically assumed correct due to the inherit 
complicated nature of political processes. Thus, it can be reasonably assumed that CEE 
countries can potentially excel at some activities more than their WE colleagues that may 
have had greater experience in the EP. 
The research questions are as follows: 
1. Are the EU member states parliamentary activities similar among the 
Baltic states, Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 and the 6 EU founding countries, or they display varying patterns 
of behavior? 
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2. Which of the Baltic states MEPs show the highest and the lowest levels of 
activism according to officially documented MEPs parliamentary 
activities? 
3. Which of the parliamentary activities – policy-related or politics-type – 
are preferred by the Central and Eastern European countries that joined 
the EU in 2004, the 6 EU founding states and MEPs of the Baltic states? 
The research is composed of several parts: 
• The theoretical research background provides the research with the 
theoretical base of explanations on the concept of activism, the 
candidate selection for the EP elections, the history of the Baltic States 
in the EP elections, etc.; 
• The methodology provides information on the methods and principles 
employed in the research; 
• The analysis of WE and CEE countries provides information on 
similarities and differences in parliamentary activities between both 
groups, providing conclusions to the first research question; 
• The analysis of Baltic MEPs provides information on the state of 
activism between representatives from the Baltic States, providing 
conclusions to the second research question; 
• The analysis of parliamentary activity preferences provides information 
the categorization of WE, CEE and Baltic MEPs, providing conclusions 
to the third research question; 
• The conclusion provides a summary of the research results.  
    
9  
1. Theoretical research background 
The theoretical research background includes information required for the 
research to base the assumptions and analysis made during the course of the thesis. In 
this case, this section of the thesis describes the concept of activism, the candidate 
selection principles for EP elections, the history of the Baltic States in the EP, the choice 
of priorities for the MEPs, their voting behavior and their division into parliamentary 
activity preferences. 
1.1. The concept of activism  
Nowadays, the concepts of “activism” and “political activism” is used 
frequently and is treated differently. In most cases the term activism refers to 
participation of different social groups and individuals in political events. By activism in 
this research is meant the parliamentary behavior of MEPs in the EP. 
The individual and group political activism are widely discussed in such fields 
as philosophy, history, political science, sociology and political psychology. Political 
activism can be described as activity of political groups or individuals, which is in 
connection with the formation and expression of personal demands and interests with the 
aim to change political, social or economic system and the appropriate institutions 
(Drozd 2015: 230). 
Activism in politics is described as a professional political activity of MPs, high 
level officials, political parties and leaders and members of certain organizations and 
even states (Drozd 2015:229-230). Scholars of different disciplines usually address 
different aspects of activism. (Joyce 2014:20-21) Activism can occur in different types 
of activism efforts: individual actions, collective tactics, campaigns, and social 
movements. At each of the types of the activism the scale and complexity of the 
particular unit increases, for example, from the action of an individual to the action of a 
social movement (Joyce 2014: 23). Regarding the MEPs of the Baltic states their actions 
in the EP can be treated as individual activism, while their activities in the European 
Party Groups (EPGs) or respectable committees can be also measured as collective 
tactics as MEPs have to vote in the lines of their represented party group or committee. 
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1.2. National party candidate selection for the EP elections 
National parties and their listed MEPs for the EP elections have a palpable 
connection. Even though national parties consider EP elections as their second priority 
and therefore there is a chance for smaller political groups to perform better in these 
elections, because voters can show their disapproval with the current governing parties 
(Klüver, Spoon 2015:554). Due to this second priority or second-order status of the EP 
elections, national parties are being considered as policy-seeking actors (Klüver, Spoon 
2015:554). The main aim of the national parties in the EP is to bring their policy agenda 
to the European level and gain the best policy outcome. Due to growing re-distribution 
of competences, there is a visible transfer of competences from the national level to the 
European level and the EP (Klüver, Spoon 2015:554). According to Klüver and Spoon 
(2015) in some policy areas, such as in agriculture, environment and internal market, 
more than 80% of current policies are being decided in Brussels, which gave the power 
to the EP in the past decades among all the other European Institutions. For instance, the 
EP can veto all legislation under the ordinary decision-making procedure (formerly co-
decision), which has been prolonged to almost all policy areas in the Treaty of Lisbon 
EP (Klüver, Spoon 2015:554). Therefore policy-seeking national parties have a chance 
to influence the European decision-making through the EP (Klüver, Spoon 2015:554). 
Thanks to this the national political parties can achieve their policy goals through their 
MEPs by shaping their voting behavior regarding the legislature. In some instances, to 
shape their MEPs voting behavior and activities in the EP, national political parties are 
even imposing threats on their MEPs, claiming they will lose their parliamentary seats 
and will have no chance of getting committee positions that are desired by many MEPs 
and national politicians in general (Klüver, Spoon 2015:555). It is not easy for the MEPs, 
because they need to follow both national and the EP political party lines. As Simon Hix 
(2002) brings out the MEPs are agents, who have two principals – their national parties 
and the EP party groups (Hix 2002:668). The policy positions of national parties can be 
completely different from the positions of the MEPs party groups. 
Other scholars as well point out the fact that European political groups can also 
interfere in the voting of MEP’s despite their individual or national party preferences. 
National party groups that form up European parties can also decide on the path of voting 
preferences of MEPs despite their individual preferences diverge. In both cases the 
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national political parties that can also form up European parties impose discipline on 
their MEPs despite their own preferences, the matter is that one influence can be 
measured as top-down, while the other as bottom-up. (Hix et al. 2007: 132) The main 
finding is that MEPs are mainly controlled by their national parties than their European 
political groups. In the case when MEP has to vote either along the lines of the national 
party that a MEP represents or European party the MEP is more likely to vote along the 
lines of the national party (Hix et al. 2007: 133). 
National parties do have more importance than the European parties regarding 
the re-election of a MEP to the EP due to the fact that national parties control the selection 
of candidates for the European elections. Therefore, MEPs tend to not give importance 
to their performance in the European political groups, while being more popular on the 
national level raises the chance to be re-elected. National parties have also impact on the 
future career of a MEP, who could seek to win elections to their national parliaments in 
order to have influence on national policies or to get a seat in the national governmental 
office. In many cases MEPs choose to stay in the EP or at least try to apply for a position 
in other EU institutions. Vast number of MEPs also return back to their national political 
careers (Hix et al. 2007:134). Despite that the European political groups have their 
influence on MEPs when a MEP has an aim to secure policy or office goals in the EP. 
This is due to the fact that European party leaderships are in control of the division of 
committee assignments and rapporteur ships, the parliamentary agenda, access to 
political group leadership positions and other offices in the parliament as well as 
speaking time in the plenary sessions (Hix et al. 2007:134). 
It is considered that in spite of the fact that European political groups are 
perceived as relatively week, they have the opportunity to remove an individual MEP or 
a national party delegation from the group. Those national parties that are not members 
of political groups and are placed as ‘non-attached members’ are not completely involved 
in the internal workings of the parliament. Their access to the legislative agenda and 
resources is mainly limited (Hix et al. 2007:135). Even if expulsion from the political 
groups is rare, there has been a case in the 5th European Parliament, when British 
Conservative MEP’s voted against the majority of the EPP. In this case most of the MEPs 
voted against initiative to expel such a large national delegation, because that would have 
weakened the EPP. 
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Regarding MEP activities and pressure from their national parties, some 
scholars refer to the concept of legislative leverage. In this context ‘leverage’ can be 
interpreted as power, which can influence a person or a situation (Frech 2015: 74). It has 
been considered that one of the main aspects of leverage is legislative activity, because 
only active MEPs can have the chance to influence policies (Frech 2015: 74). 
In order to sum up MEPs are being considered as typical elected 
parliamentarians in democratic political systems, but the only difference that they share 
is that they have two competing principals – their national political parties and European 
parties. These two groups mainly shape the behavior of MEPs. While national parties can 
control the election and re-elections of the MEP in the Parliament, the European Parties 
can affect the MEP’s policy making inside the Parliament. (Hix et. al. 2007: 136) 
1.3. The Baltic States in the European Parliament  
The Baltic States attained membership in the EU in 2004. Later that same year 
these countries experienced their first EP elections that saw the accession of respectively 
9, 6 and 13 MEPs from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. (EPv: 2017). The number of MEPs 
from every member state in most cases is proportional to its population. However, such 
principles contradict themselves in terms of smaller countries that are permitted to elect 
more MEPs than their population numbers allow (EPE:2017).  
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Table 1.1 European Parliament elections in Estonia (EPv:2017)  
Year of 
elections 
Number of parties 
represented in 
elections 
Number of 
candidates 
represented 
The amount of 
electorate 
participating in 
the election 
2004 18 95 26,8% 
2009 14 101 43,9% 
2014 9 88 36,5% 
 
In the first Estonian EP elections in 2004 participated between 18 political 
parties and unions, in total 95 candidates (EPv: 2017). During the 2009 EP elections 
43.9% of the electorate voted, significantly higher than the elections in 2004. However, 
the number of political parties has declined since the previous election, while the number 
of candidates has marginally increased. The 2009 elections introduced closed party lists 
thus eliminating individual candidate lists (Mayer 2010:96). The reason behind the 
sudden increase of voter activity was the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Mayer 
2010:99). Domestic politics also influenced voter activity due to Estonia having its own 
municipal elections in 2009 (Mayer 2010:99). Mayer (2010) elaborates further that the 
EP elections might have been a protest vote by the population to show its disapproval 
with the government and the country’s overall situation. (Mayer 2010:99) Estonia is 
remarkable for having the first e-voting capabilities in the EU during the elections in 
2009, which may have influenced the voter turnout. (Mayer 2010:101).  
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Table 1.2 European Parliament elections in Latvia (EPV:2017) 
Year of 
elections 
Number of parties 
represented in 
elections 
Number of 
candidates 
represented 
The amount of the 
electorate participating 
in election 
2004 16 245 41,3% 
2009 16 186 53,7% 
2014 14 170 30,2% 
 
The first Latvian EP elections saw the participation of 16 political parties and 
unions, and 245 MEP candidates. (EPV: 2017) The high number of candidates may be 
explained with such elections happening for the first time. However, after the first 
elections voter activity has steadily decreased. Analysis of EP elections display that the 
highest voter activity was observed in 2009, which could be linked to the financial crisis 
at the time. Of all three Baltic States, Latvia experienced the greatest hardship 
economically and politically (MFA 2009). The 2009 elections coincided with the 
municipal elections to attract more voters not only in Latvia, but also abroad. The Latvian 
electorate had the second lowest level of trust in the EP (39%) in 2008 and the lowest of 
any EU country in terms of considering the membership as beneficial – only 42% of the 
population considered membership in the EU as favorable (Auers 2010:175). 
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Table 1.3 European Parliament elections in Lithuania (EPE:2017, VRK:2017) 
Year of 
elections 
Number of parties 
represented in 
elections 
Number of 
candidates 
represented 
The amount of 
electorate 
participating in 
the election 
2004 12 242 48,4% 
2009 15 262 21% 
2014 10 301 47,4% 
 
In 2004 and 2009 there were more political parties represented in the EP 
elections, while in their lists were less candidates. The low voter activity in Lithuania 
could be related with the number of national elections in 2008 and 2009, for example, 
two rounds of municipal election in October 2008 and the presidential elections at 
approximately the same period as the EP elections (Braghiroli 2010a:180). First EP 
elections in June 2004 showed that in Lithuania there was rather low voter activity (48%) 
and the votes were gained mainly by liberal parties, which got 10 out of 13 seats for 
Lithuania (Braghiroli 2010a:178). The global financial crisis in 2009 was one of the main 
motivators for Lithuania to join the Eurozone, which it did on the 1st of January on 2015. 
Lithuania was the last of all three Baltic states to join the Eurozone. In comparison to 
Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania didn’t have visible Euroscepticism among the political 
parties. In the EU accession referendum, which was held in 2003, more than 90% of the 
voters voted for Lithuania’s membership in the EU (Braghiroli 2010a:178). One of the 
main factors why in Lithuania there was a low EP election turnout can be explained by 
the general lack of information and public frustration with the existing political elite lead 
to such poor result (Braghiroli 2010a:184). It has been claimed that in Lithuania the low 
voter turnout is mainly a result of voters’ lack of interest towards the EP elections, which 
is due to lack of information from the media and politicians (Braghiroli 2010a:186). 
When comparing these results from the first elections of the European 
Parliament in Latvia and Estonia there is visible a vast difference. In Latvia even if the 
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activity of voters can’t be registered as high in the first EP elections, it is still higher than 
in Estonia and the difference between the first and second EP elections is 12,4% if we 
compare to 17,1% in Estonia. In the EP elections the amount of political parties and 
political unions is high if compared to Estonia. While in Estonia there was a tendency of 
the number of political parties to drop off. In both countries the number of candidates 
listed is also decreasing. 
In Lithuania the same as in Latvia and Estonia the amount of political parties 
represented in the EP elections has been decreasing since the first EP elections in 2004. 
One remarkable difference that Lithuania has is that the number of candidates represented 
in the EP has only grown, while in Latvia and Estonia we can see decrease both in the 
number of political parties and in the number of candidates represented in the party lists.  
In Lithuania this could be a result of a political party merge. Another significant 
difference is that in Lithuania in 2009 the activity of voters is very low, if compared to 
other two Baltic state countries. In the EP elections of 2009 in Latvia and Lithuania was 
recorded the highest voter activity. 
1.4. MEP’s daily life in the European Parliament: choice of priorities  
MEP activities in the European Parliament (EP) are not easy to measure, one 
should take into consideration several different variables. Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) 
have done similar research focusing more on the likelihood of MEPs re-election. 
According to research by Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) re-election stems from the MEPs 
individual performance or activism in the EP (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:5-6). In this regard 
MEPs voting behaviour, their plenary attendance rate and the general parliamentary 
output level should be taken into consideration as important observable implications that 
raise the probability of MEPs to be re-elected in the EP, which is desired by most of them. 
Despite the fact that the EP elections are of a second-order and that what counts is the 
performance of these MEPs on national, but not on the EP level if a MEP desires to be 
re-elected. This was not empirically tested and for this reason Sigalas and Tiemann 
(2012) decided to take into consideration all the before mentioned variables (plenary 
session attendance, reports drafted and amended, opinions, questions, speeches, motions 
for resolutions and written declarations) and voting loyalty. They measure voting loyalty 
through roll-call votes as they claim that those should reflect it and because these votes 
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are being recorded. The likelihood that MEPs will attend these votings that are recorded 
is greater and according to the scholars will not say much of their relative activism in the 
EP. They also take into consideration the average age of MEPs. From this goes that those 
MEPs that are older are more likely to be more experienced in the national politics and 
for them it would be easy to find their way in the EP (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:5-6). At 
some point being older for the MEP can be beneficial, but the closer a MEP is getting to 
his retirement age the more likely he will not be re-elected once more. 
The amount of each MEP’s productivity in the EP can be seen in their 
legislative, contemplative and supervision functions of the EP. Drafting and amending 
reports has been considered as one of the main processes for shaping and adjusting 
policies at the EU level (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). Non-legislative reports also are 
essential, because these are written by the rapporteur, who is the main person for the 
Commission and for all the other institutions and groups, which need to coordinate this 
procedure. Parliamentary questions are used for different reasons, for example, when it 
is needed to receive or send information to other EU institutions, when giving importance 
to issues and analysing the Commissioners (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). Plenary speeches 
are those that enable MEPs to reach the wider public and allow them to communicate 
their own views on different issues to their national party, their European group and to 
their national constituencies (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). Written declarations and 
motions for resolutions are made to give importance and to push the Commission to act. 
Written declarations and motions for resolutions have different functions and are useful 
for MEPs to show their activity in the EP for their constituencies and national parties. In 
this regard it can be expected that MEPs activism or how these authors name it ‘outcome’ 
is in connection with the possibility to be re-elected. This correlation is true if a MEP is 
active not only in the EP, but also pays attention of having political ties also ‘back home’ 
otherwise their overall parliamentary activity in the EP if it is at expense of the national 
one will not grant them a place in the European Parliament twice. From this goes that 
MEPs plenary session attendance rate in the Parliament should be high to be re-elected, 
because it correlates positively with their general activism, because if one attends plenary 
sessions he can bring out more policy change and it refers to the one of the main duties 
of a MEP – voting (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). It has also been assumed that the EP is a 
test ground for new MEPs, who are seeking re-elections or aim for a desirable higher 
position either in the EU institutions or at the national stage (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:7). 
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An active MEP can have well done rapporteur ships and his influence in the EP can be 
seen, but if he loses touch with his constituency there is a high possibility that he will not 
be re-elected in the EP once more (Corbett et al. 2007:65). 
Many MEPs after the end of their terms in the EP become ministers in their 
member states and they have had the necessary experience in the EP level. It has been 
mentioned that a good MP in the national context is a one who is successful in debates 
and is able to score points over his opponents (Corbett et al. 2007:9). An effective MEP 
is one who can explain, advise and negotiate with his colleagues from 27 different 
countries in 3 different levels (Corbett et al. 2007:9). MEPs need to have a common 
position as a group within their political group work and then also they need to find a 
common ground with other political groups in the EP (Corbett et al. 2007:10). When the 
Parliament has a position, they need to have a negotiation process with the Council to 
receive the outcome. This gives an active MEP a broad sphere to show his attachment to 
the EP (Corbett et al.  2007:10). The Rules of the Parliament are stating that MEPs: “[…] 
shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate […]” 
(Corbett et al.  2007:10). This is emphasized further by the Members Statute of 28 
September 2005, which continues with that: “Members shall be free and independent” 
and that “Members shall vote on an individual and personal basis” (Corbett et al. 
2007:10). They should be free from any external influence on how they vote, how they 
organize their work and should have freedom of speech regarding what they want to say. 
Usually while being in the EP MEPs tend to follow their party group lines (Corbett et al.  
2007:61). 
Priorities of MEPs are vastly different the same as their background in the EP. 
Some are usually more visible in plenary, other are more successful within committee, 
in their political group or their national party delegation. Others pay more attention to 
their national or regional political image. Some members remain generalists, because 
they are not focusing on one specific area in the EP. Others specialize and can be 
regarded as specialists and always allocate reports or opinions within a policy area. Some 
can be regarded as functionalists and are not focused on policies. Some are having only 
short amount of their working time in Brussels, while others are always present (Corbett 
et al.  2007:65). 
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Despite being in two locations, Brussels or Strasbourg, MEPs must deal with 
the fact that several meetings can overlap, for example, the meeting with the main 
committee may overlap with a hearing or debate in another committee, which could be 
valuable to the MEP. Intergroup meetings also are time consuming. MEPs also must 
organize their time, because there are frequent visitors from their constituency, region or 
home country. In many cases MEPs are being invited to participate in seminars and 
conferences due to their knowledge of European affairs. MEPs as every politician also 
need to deal with the press and must give interviews to the journalists residing in Brussels 
or of their home country (Hix et al. 2007:61). 
In some positions that MEPs hold the pressure is even greater, for example, the 
Parliament’s president, the leaders of the Political groups and of national party 
delegations, committee chairmen and committee coordinators, together with rapporteurs 
on controversial policy issues. The aforementioned positions that MEPs are filling are 
even more time consuming. MEPs that have shown themselves as experts in a certain 
field can also be more occupied (Hix et al. 2007:61). 
Every MEP must make a tough decision regarding their priorities. While being 
successful in the committee or political group work can help to gain power within the 
Parliament, there is a chance to lose touch with a national political party, which can result 
in that the MEP can risk with re-election possibilities. There are several factors that affect 
priorities set by each MEP, such as geographical proximity of the working places of the 
Parliament (Hix et al. 2007:62). 
Another factor is the MEPs own interests and responsibilities. MEPs in different 
positions in the EP can have different priorities. Those that are members of small groups 
and non-attached members pay more interest to plenary sessions, while those residing in 
large groups will pay more attention to committee work. Cultural differences can also 
play a role in the choice of priorities, for example, MEPs of Northern Europe spend more 
time on technical legislation than members of Southern European countries. Members 
from the UK traditionally give more significance on the Question Time in the plenary. 
One can say that every MEP shares different priorities within the European Parliament, 
but what they all have in common is that they have relatively freedom to set their own 
priorities. They only need to follow the internal rules of the Political Groups to which 
they belong (Hix et al. 2007:63). 
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1.5. MEPs voting behaviour and division of MEPs parliamentary preferences in 
the EP  
Many scholars have identified similar patterns when it comes to division of 
preferences by MEPs in the EP. For example, Stefano Braghiroli mentions that there are 
MEPs who have skills that are Europe-oriented and are in connection with their 
parliamentary activism in their home country and some are building EP careers separately 
from their national politics (Braghiroli 2010b:8). The second representation style is 
usually favored by MEPs that have been in office for a longer period. Bale and Taggart 
offer a different division of MEPs preferences by grouping them by several roles as: “1. 
policy advocate (dedication to a limited range of issues); 2. constituency representative 
(emphasis on a particular constituency or interest group); 3. European evangelist (strong 
commitment to the European project); 4. institutionalist (focus on a specific institution, 
be it national or European). (Bale, Taggart 2005: 11).” In the particular interest of this 
research Bale and Taggart describe that those MEPs that belong to the constituency 
representative group could be representatives of small states, such as Latvia and Estonia. 
Bale and Taggart broaden this division into additional 3 types of constituency 
(local/regional, national or functional) (Bale, Taggart 2005: 12-13). Scholars elaborate 
more on this by mentioning that such MEPs will tend to represent their electoral 
constituency. Bale and Taggart define that those MEPs representing national level 
constituency type will try to represent their country in the EP and in the EU institutions 
in general (Bale, Taggart 2005: 12-13). This particular type is probably represented by 
every small state including the Baltic States, where one of the main triggers for MEPs is 
to address certain important issues of their country in the EP and in the EU while making 
an attractive image of their country in the EP and in the whole EU. Nevertheless, it does 
not exclude MEPs from relatively bigger countries than the Baltic states to be those to 
represent national level constituency type. Supposedly MEPs that are European-oriented 
are trying to bring into light their local issues through the framework of the EU. Bale and 
Taggart describe members of functional group as those that put emphasis on their own 
identity, which is not territorially defined, for example, ethnic or religious identity, and 
will try to empower themselves as the spokesperson of this group through the framework 
of the EP. One of the factors, which makes it difficult for these MEPs is that in order to 
be attractive to their constituencies they need to travel a lot between Brussels and their 
home country, which makes the working life for themselves a lot harder. As the authors 
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mention, national constituency orientation is preferred by the new member states, 
especially the small states. There are MEPs that are representing the European Evangelist 
role, which is described as the one where a MEP has devoted himself equally for work in 
national and party group lines. They focus on the issues that are comprehensive and pan-
European (Bale, Taggart 2005:13-16). 
A different view of MEPs preferences is shared by Simon Hix. He provides a 
model with two ideological dimensions in European politics: the left/right dimension and 
the pro/anti-Europe dimension (Hix et al. 2006:2). The place where the MEP can be found 
in this scale is a good indicator of his ideological preferences on issues in the EP (Hix 
2002:689). He claims that the reason why MEPs legislative behavior is different also is 
based on the fact that EP as a chamber is a relatively new idea where several political 
parties are represented, with different decision rules and influences and different policy 
preferences. For example, MEPs can be influenced by national interests and their own 
national party policies and can have European party affiliations. In a way MEP needs to 
respond to two “principals”: their national parties, who are responsible for their election 
and the political groups in the EP, who are in charge of controlling private interests in the 
EP, as leadership positions, committee assignments, speaking time, and the legislative 
agenda (Hix 2002:690). Simon Hix compares this pressure on MEPs with the one of U.S. 
Representatives, who have their pressure between constituency and legislative 
convention interests, and by legislators in parliamentary systems, between local parties 
and parliamentary factions (Hix 2002:688-689). He offers three possible explanations of 
MEP voting behavior: personal ideological beliefs, European party discipline, or national 
party discipline (Hix 2002:690-692). He emphasizes that those MEPs that vote based on 
their personal ideological beliefs are voting solely following their ideology. MEPs that 
have European party discipline usually belong to strong EP parties that are powerful 
organizations and can impose sanctions on MEP’s that defects from those. As Hix claims, 
any MEP should follow the leadership of his party group regardless his ideological 
location (Hix 2002: 690). MEPs that follow National party discipline are a larger group 
due to the fact that MEPs are elected through their national party candidacy in the EP, so 
they have the strongest influence. In all European Union member states national party 
leaders do have at least some control over their candidates’ election in the EP, either 
through the national party executive determining the list of candidates (as in France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, 
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Finland or Austria etc.) or via the national party executive approving candidates selected 
by regional organs (as in Britain, Germany, Italy, or Ireland) (Hix 2002: 691). The results 
by Hix confirm that the EP is driven mainly by national party preferences and that those 
are the ones to blame in case of a MEP defecting from its EP party group (Hix 2002: 
694). 
To test aforementioned assumptions, he compares MEP’s policy preferences 
with their legislative behavior. In his research he states a central claim: in the EP the 
political groups have a significant impact on MEPs voting behavior (Hix 2002:689). The 
author mentions that EP political groups are those that advise and support MEPs to 
overcome their collective action problems by organizing a division of labor with like-
minded legislators, MEPs can reach legislative agenda, resources, and committee 
assignments (Hix 2002:689). In return MEPs must follow the path on how to vote given 
by their EP party leaders. One of the indications that it works is the growing level of 
intra-party voting likeness, or "party cohesion" (Hix 2002:689). In this case we can 
compare it to the U.S. system, where several scholars claim that legislative parties are 
the ones that control voting behavior in the House and Senate (Hix 2002:689). As Hix 
claims, if a political group in the EP shows a high level of cohesion in voting, it doesn’t 
mean only that the leaders of the political group have pushed their MEPs to vote together 
or that the national member parties have the same policy positions as the EP party. A 
MEP can also vote in favor of their EP party position disregarding his national party 
connection (Hix 2002:689-690). 
Thorsten Faas brings out 3 main directions chosen by MEPs in the EP: re-
election seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking (Faas 2002:7-9). He in his research 
tries to explain the influence of electoral system differences on MEP behavior. As Faas 
outlines mostly in EU member states are used party lists and within those lists some 
countries have chosen preferential voting (voting for individual candidates within the list) 
(Faas 2002:7). He admits that these voting differences affect MEPs’ behavior in the 
European Parliament, because of responsibility that MEPs’ have towards their voter 
requests. As voters are interested in the functioning of the EP and cannot oversee their 
elected MEPs’ behavior, MEP’s don’t need to adapt their voting behavior and can have 
time also for their constituency or devote their time for other individual goals (Faas 
2002:7). Faas stresses that in the EP there is a great variety of methods for candidate 
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selection in each member state. This can be dated with the time when member states 
candidates are chosen through their national parties without any influence from Europe 
(Faas 2002:8). Some parties have chosen a centralized method, where the main party 
officials are the main candidates, while others choose a system in which other members 
have the final word. The author mentions that communication of MEPs and their national 
parties is relatively weak once they are elected (Faas 2002:8). All this points to that EP 
party groups don’t have control over MEPs’ and some cases their national parties are 
highly interested to control their MEPs’ behavior in strong manner and then they behave 
in so-called “home style” behavior (Faas 2002:7). As already mentioned by other 
scholars, MEPs’ are often planning to have a successful career also outside of the EP. 
Today there are more such MEPs that have set as their goal to build a European career, 
rather than return back to their home countries. As another point the author brings out the 
party group cohesion in the EP due to strong influence of national parties on the MEPs 
voting behavior (Faas 2002:7). National parties can have their pressure on MEPs voting 
patterns if it involves re-election possibility for the MEP. Faas continues with data where 
is showed that 40 % of parties are providing voting manuals to their MEPs, when 
important issues are being touched which bring their attention to their second objective – 
office-seeking (Faas 2002:7). As MEPs usually are party group members party groups 
can issue advantages in connection with internal action in the EP. Party groups are those 
that have control over the committee assignments. The author compares the EP system 
with the US system, where such discretion is not visible and where “seniority” is 
important (Faas 2002:8). Party groups can also control the distribution of main positions 
in the EP, for example, positions in the Bureau of the EP, committee chairs and vice-
chairs and rapporteur ships and in this case, it is different from the US. (Faas 2002:8). 
These positions are distributed proportionally regarding the strength among the party 
groups. Party group leadership has a major impact on the career paths of MEPs within 
the EP, because they have the right to distribute essential committee positions and 
rapporteur ships among their members. When speaking about party group cohesion then 
in situation when national parties are involved in the voting process in the EP there is a 
high chance that national delegation is likely to defect in case of a conflict situation and 
the party group leadership can’t affect anything, but only accept this fact. On condition 
when there is no push from the national parties, the party group leaders can influence 
their MEPs to push their agenda to have party group cohesion (Faas 2002:8). 
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Faas further elaborates on that the party group leadership is more interested in 
the actions taking part in the EU then the national party’s leadership. So, in a scenario 
when national party doesn’t interfere in party groups’ voting patterns the party group 
cohesion remains strong. The last type mentioned by Faas is policy-seeking in the EP 
(Faas 2002:8). He mentions that institutional environment in the EP is very significant 
and is in the scale of power as powerful as the Commission and Council. For a policy to 
be effective, majority of MEPs must participate in the voting for the proposal, this is 
often called “grand coalition” due to the low attendance of MEPs in the EP. Only by 
“grand coalition” it is possible to overcome the high threshold (Faas 2002:8). This can 
lead either to higher cohesiveness among the party groups, or it can lead also to the 
interference of national parties in such important policy decisions, which would lead to 
lower party group cohesiveness. These differences in majority requirements and in 
legislative agenda can cause diverse behavior of MEPs. 
This research recalls also on that in the EP there are some Euro-sceptic or anti-
Euro parties represented. These parties are assumed to show anti-European standing in 
many decisions made in the EP. In this case they practice “home style” behavior and one 
of their goals is to correspond to the Euro-sceptic attitude of their national party and to 
defect from all other European party groups agenda. 
Robert van Geffen (2016) has divided MEPs in two categories: former national 
politicians and ‘one-off’ MEPs (Geffen 2016:1017). He has made his division based on 
different career paths that MEPs choose while being in the EP. By diving MEPs in two 
categories he also links MEPs chosen career paths with their activities in the EP. 
According to Robert van Geffen (2016) politicians change their behavior according to 
their own career ambitions (Geffen 2016:1017). He has based his paper on a research 
made by Scarrow (1997). She focuses on how EP membership fits into the political career 
paths of MEPs by dividing them in three categories: (1) the young ‘stepping-stone’ 
politicians aiming for a career in domestic politics; (2) the long-term ‘EP careerists’; and 
(3) the short-term MEPs close to retirement or looking for a career outside politics 
(Geffen 2016:1017). Robert van Geffen (2016) in his research adds up two more 
categories of MEP: MEPs who have already had a political career at national level but 
are not close to retirement and ‘one-off’ MEPs who only stay in the EP for a short period 
of time (Geffen 2016:1018). Robert van Geffen (2016) measures the impact on behavior 
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of the different types of MEPs in a number of OLS regression models where certain types 
of activities are included as dependent variables such as roll-call votes, reports amended, 
and motions tabled. The data is taken from the website Votewatch.eu. These certain 
activities have been chosen, because those can measure the overall level of activity in 
the EP (Geffen 2016:1024). 
According to the empirical findings of Robert van Geffen (2016) the attendance 
rate of EP careerists, former national politicians and one-off MEPs in plenary can be 
considered as high. EP careerists attend more votes and their attendance rates are about 
10 % higher than other MEPs plenary attendance rates (Geffen 2016:1026). According 
to number of reports amended in the EP young MEPs and one-off MEPs on average 
submit amendments to around three to four more reports than their colleagues. This is 
explained by the fact that MEPs seeking a career in the EP are more likely to be 
rapporteurs themselves, therefore they would submit less amendments to reports (Geffen 
2016:1027). Another parliamentary activity analyzed is number of motions tabled by an 
MEP. In this certain activity EP careerists can be considered as the most active among 
all other MEPs in the EP by tabling seven motions more than their peers. The young 
MEPs, former national politicians and one-off MEPs do not show a substantially high 
number of motions tabled in Parliament. The dominance of EP careerists in this activity 
could be explained by the fact that EP careerists aim to be more visible among the EPG 
and Parliament leadership in order to grant themselves the desired seats in the EP. Young, 
retiring and one-off MEPs do not show such interest towards this activity. Former 
national politicians could also be expected to show similar levels of activity as EP 
careerists, but they have already served as national politicians and have showed their 
excellence as national politicians (Geffen 2016:1027). 
This concludes that young and unexperienced MEPs who, after a short period of 
time in the EP, seek for a career in domestic politics were not expected to show high 
levels of activism in the EP. This can be proven by their low attendance rate in the plenary 
and by the limited number of motions tabled in the Parliament (Geffen 2016:1028). The 
only parameter where young MEPs are showing higher level of activity is by submitting 
amendments to reports as if they are seeking to become rapporteurs tabling amendments 
is the main way to influence legislation (Geffen 2016:1028). The EP careerists can be 
considered as very active in the EP’s work. As mentioned they attend plenary sessions 
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more than other types of MEPs and are eager to table more motions than their other 
colleagues. In this way EP careerists can opt for their desired position in the EP by 
appealing to their EPG leadership. EP careerists table fewer amendments to reports, 
because usually they are rapporteurs themselves (Geffen 2016:1029). The former 
domestic politicians, who have had a career in domestic politics and who desire to build 
a career in the EP are overall active in the EP. They have lower plenary meetings 
attendance rates and they table fewer motions than the EP careerists (Geffen 2016:1029). 
They could have less pressure and therefore they have no need for conducting a lot of the 
groundwork as tabling motions, because they have proved their ability in the national 
political arena (Geffen 2016:1029). The one-off MEPs are more active than expected by 
the scholar, however they are active in areas which do not demand particular qualities or 
previous political experience, such as attending plenary voting sessions and tabling 
amendments to reports, which (Geffen 2016:1029). 
1.6. MEPs division into parliamentary activities preferences in the EP  
András Bíró-Nagy (2016) in his research has examined the role orientations of 
Central European MEPs based on the factors that influence their strategies and on the 
relationship between their roles and activities. He has chosen Central and Eastern 
European countries that joined the EU in 2004 he Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia and has evaluated MEPs role orientations in the term of 2009-
2014. According to the quantitative research by Bíró-Nagy (2016) the roles of MEPs can 
be explained by two divisions: policy/politics and European/national. These two 
divisions can be influenced by different socio-demographic factors, attitudes and 
political socialization and that can determine what roles MEPs choose. The author in his 
research focuses on important variables as the time spent in the EP, age, previous 
political experience, party affiliation, left-right self-definition and career ambitions. 
These aforementioned factors can explain the political behavior of MEPs. The Central 
European MEPs’ focus on politics vs. policy and the European vs. national political arena 
have different roots, and different variables explain them. Orientation towards politics 
and policy mostly depends on previous political experience and future career ambitions 
of a MEP, while focus on the European or the national level is best explained by age, 
party affiliation and left-right self-definition (Bíró-Nagy 2016:1). In order to explain the 
socio-demographic factors that can influence that role orientations of MEPs the author 
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has conducted a field research, which is a questionnaire-based representative survey 
covering 40% of Central European MEPs in the 2009–2014 term (Bíró-Nagy 2016:3). 
Based on the poles of the two dimensions, Bíró-Nagy (2016) constructs 4 homogenous 
groups, which are substantially different and serves as a basis for further analysis: 
1) EU Policy-makers (MEPs who are specialized in policy making in the EP); 
2) National Policy-makers (MEPs who are specialized in policy making on 
national level); 
3) EU Politicians (MEPs that are by territorial distribution focused on the 
European level); 
4) National Politicians (MEPs that are by territorial distribution focused on 
the national level). 
According to the results of Bíró-Nagy (2016) it is visible that Central European 
MEPs with focus on the European level outnumber the nationally-oriented Central 
European MEPs (28 to 17) (Bíró-Nagy 2016:13). The policy/politics division features 
30 MEPs on its policy side and 15 MEPs who are geared more towards politics. Bíró-
Nagy (2016) mentions that pure roles are rare amongst MEPs. It is more important to 
point out that some roles are dominant, but those are not exclusive ones. From this goes 
that MEPs can choose to fill other roles depending on the situation (Bíró-Nagy 2016:14). 
MEP needs to give preference to certain activities in the EP, be it politics vs. policy or 
national vs. European career. A MEP can choose either to be more generalist in the EP 
or focus more on one field and become an expert in it. There can exist a situation when 
a MEP builds a strong profile as an EU Policy-maker, but regularly weighs in on matters 
of domestic politics in his or her home country. Role overlapping, or role switch is not 
considered as a negative aspect, but rather as a positive in the terms of a career 
possibilities for a MEP in the EP (Bíró-Nagy 2016:14). If a MEP’s concern is possible 
re-election it is possible that a MEP will leave national political career behind (Bíró-
Nagy 2016:3). For MEPs their national constituency is of a special importance due to the 
re-election factor, therefore a MEP must balance between having links in the EP and 
outside of it, which are of the same importance. A MEP should have contacts with other 
institutions, national politics, the domestic press, advocacy groups and citizens (Bíró-
Nagy 2016:5). 
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In addition to the various socio-demographic factors that influence the role 
orientations of Central European MEPs, it is of a high importance to review the 
relationship that exists between various roles and the work of legislators, because the 
roles are not only made of attitudes but also of behavioral characteristics. The activities 
of MEPs can be split in two parts: officially documented activities inside the European 
Parliament and all other work conducted outside of the institution (Bíró-Nagy 2016:18-
19). In the fifth chapter of his research Bíró-Nagy (2016) analyses role orientations of 
Central European MEPs and the particular analysis includes their activities within and 
outside of the European Parliament (Bíró-Nagy 2016:2). Bíró-Nagy (2016) sets a 
hypothesis that the policy/politics dimension of political roles is clearly visible in the 
activities MEPs choose in the EP (Bíró-Nagy 2016:2). In order to test this hypothesis 
Bíró-Nagy examines officially documented activities in the EP by using the data from 
Votewatch. eu and calculating the average mark for each of the parameters: plenary 
speeches, motions for resolutions, parliamentary questions, written declarations, reports, 
opinions and amendments. 
Bíró-Nagy (2016) claims that orientation towards politics or policy is very 
visible when we look at what parliamentary activities MEPs spend their energy on. He 
has divided all activities as either policy-related (being a rapporteur, drafting opinions 
and submitting amendments) and as politics-type activities (plenary speeches, motions 
for resolutions, parliamentary questions, and written declarations).  
If looking at concrete numbers, it appears that Central European MEPs who 
have a Politician profile are not more active in politics-type activities than Policy-makers, 
but within their own activities these actions have a bigger role. While the activities of 
policy-makers cover all the genres to at least an average degree, for Politicians it counts 
only for politics-type tasks (Bíró-Nagy 2016:19-21). On average, National Politicians 
and EU Politicians are delivering more speeches in plenary sessions than National Policy 
makers and therefore they are not far behind EU Policy-makers, who are the most active 
group of MEPs. Moreover, National Politicians do not reach the average in any other 
forms of activity, which shows that National Politicians are rather passive towards policy 
and politics related activities which are somewhat more difficult to resolve. In all of their 
activities EU Politicians surpass National Politicians, for example, when compared with 
National Politicians they use parliamentary questions, motions for resolutions and 
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written statements more, and they are not as passive in the field of policy as their 
nationally focused peers (Bíró-Nagy 2016:19-21). As based on the data Bíró-Nagy 
(2016) states that role orientations are visible in MEPs behavior within the European 
Parliament. MEPs with a politics focus show average political activity, while they deal 
less with policy work. Policy-makers use political tools to an average degree, but they 
show high results of activity when it comes to policy genres (Bíró-Nagy 2016:19-21). 
Bíró-Nagy (2016) concludes that variables as time spent in the EP, age, the 
nature of previous political experience, party affiliation, left-right self-definition and 
future career ambitions are parameters that allow to accurately determine the role 
orientation of a MEP (Bíró-Nagy 2016:19-25). Furthermore, the author admits that the 
policy/politics and European/national axes have different roots and that those are 
explained by different variables. As for activity trends inside and outside of the EP 
demonstrate that the dimensions used to divide role orientations are visible in the behavior 
of Central European MEPs. The differences between politics and policy orientations are 
visible in officially documented parliamentary genres (plenary speeches, motions for 
resolutions, parliamentary questions, written declarations, reports, opinions and 
amendments) (Bíró-Nagy 2016:19-25). By this the author refers to the data collected from 
the website Votewatch.eu, which monitors MEPs parliamentary activities in the EP.
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2. Methodology 
The methodology section includes information on the methods and process of 
how the analysis is conducted. It additionally provides argumentation for the choice of 
certain data sets in the research and how the data is used to answer the research questions. 
The section describes the type of information collected for the research, methods used 
for collecting data for the research, the research process itself, as well as explanations 
and definitions for designations used in the analysis. 
2.1. Activism measurement by 9 parameters 
This research is based on the empirical data that consists of activism 
measurement of each MEP in the EP in 9 parameters. These 9 parameters (Reports as a 
Rapporteur, Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur, Opinions as a Rapporteur, Opinions as a 
Shadow Rapporteur, Reports Amended, Parliamentary Questions (PQs), Motions for 
Resolutions, Written Declarations, Speeches in the Plenary) are from the website 
Mepranking.eu that monitors daily duties of MEPs in the EP. The data that is represented 
in this section is collected in October 2018 with the final update of the data in the website 
listed as 31st October 2018.  
Although the source includes 12 parameters for every MEP, only the 
aforementioned nine parameters are used for the research. This exclusion of parameters, 
which are Explanation of Vote, Plenary Attendance and Roll-call Votes, is explained 
with their exclusion in the division of parliamentary activity preference by Bíró-Nagy 
(2016) on which the analysis of preference is based upon. Roll-call Votes and Plenary 
Attendance are also excluded because the likelihood that MEPs will attend these is 
greater and, according to the scholars Sigalas and Tiemann (2012), will not say much of 
their relative activism in the EP (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:5-6). 
2.2. Selection of data by a common attribute 
To avoid discrepancies and inaccuracies in the data the research requires one 
certain attribute that can be applied to all data. Selecting a single common attribute in all 
the collected data ensures that all the parameter numbers of MEPs are comparable. Thus, 
the common attribute that can be comparable for this research is the time period that a 
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MEP has spent in the 8th EP. Since this particular EP started serving on 1st of July 2014, 
then this date is adequate for the research, as it includes the greatest number of MEPs 
parameter data that can be used for the analysis based on data available on 
Mepranking.eu. 
By selecting the data of MEPs that started their mandate on 1st of July 2014, this 
exclude a number of MEPs that started their mandates on a later date, even the same year. 
For example, in the case of Baltic MEPs, the analysis does not include MEPs like Ivari 
Padar, who started his mandate on 6th of November 2017. The same argumentation is 
utilized throughout all the MEPs of every EU member state. 
Since the common attribute excludes certain MEPs, it is vital to know the 
number of MEPs eligible for analysis. According to the source of the data, currently 741 
MEPs from all member states are serving in the EP. By selecting the MEPs that fit the 
common attribute restriction, the total number of MEPs for analysis is 643. 
The common attribute – time spent – is also considered as valid for this research, 
because the activities of a MEP, who has spent more time in the EP, are not directly 
comparable to a MEP that has served a shorter time period. However, although that may 
not be the case, as time spent in the EP may not cause the MEP to be more active, this 
ensures that all MEPs have had the same amount of time to garner significant results for 
analysis. 
2.3. Research and analysis process 
The data collection process is conducted by in total lasted two days. Data is 
collected by selecting the required information from the source of data and inserted into 
a table. The method of collection is selecting a specific MEP and recording their 
parameter results, displayed in whole numbers, into the table. The process itself provides 
difficulties, as there is no automated data collection solution provided by the managers 
of the source, thus the data was collected manually for every entry. The acquired data is 
relevant for the time period of 1st of July 2014 (the start of the current EP) and 31st of 
October 2018 (the date of the last update of data).  
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The MEPs are initially categorized by member state in individual tables. After 
this, the averages for every parameter of every member state are included in a separate 
table. This table also includes calculations for the EU average of every parameter by 
member state, as well as the activism of every member state. The produced table serves 
as the basis for the analysis of WE and CEE countries. 
The second part of calculations comes in the form of calculating the parameter 
averages and activism of all MEPs regardless of member state. The process is similar for 
the table regarding WE and CEE countries, i.e., all MEPs are included in a separate table 
where necessary calculations are performed. After this, the MEPs from Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania are selected for the analysis of Baltic MEPs. 
After the collection and sorting of data by requirements, and performing the 
necessary calculations, the analysis of activism can be produced. For the six EU founding 
states and for CEE countries (including the three Baltic states) that joined the EU in 2004 
the calculation results, including the EU average, are displayed in several graphs – one 
for every parameter and one for activism. The separation of states into groups and the 
inclusion of what country is counted as an EU founding state or CEE is explained in the 
theoretical basis. Then the produced graphs are displayed with additional commentary 
provided on the available results, including comparison between WE and CEE and the 
importance of every parameter in terms of activism. 
2.4. Formula for calculating activism 
The formula that is used in this research to measure the average activism of 
MEPs has been used by Stefano Braghiroli in his research about MEP parliamentary 
loyalty. This research measures MEPs’ parliamentary activism. When calculating the 
activism of MEPs by using activism measurement formula there are excluded two 
parameters (roll-call votes and plenary session attendance) as these two parameters are 
measured in percentage and the likelihood that MEPs will attend these votings that are 
recorded is greater and according to the scholars Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) will not 
say much of their relative activism in the EP (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:5-6). The averages 
for all parameters are identified by AVG[n], where n is the sequential number of the 
parameter abbreviation ATR, for example, AVG1 would be the average of ATR1 in the 
EP. 
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The formula is modified to suit the needs of this research by dividing the number 
of elements in it: 
Table 2.1 Formula for the measurement of activism (Braghiroli 2010b) 
ACTIVISM = ("#$%"&'% + "#$)"&') + "#$*"&'* + "#$+"&'+ + "#$,"&', + "#$-"&'- + "#$."&'. + "#$/"&'/ +"#$0"&'0)/9 
 
2.5. Parameter descriptions 
ATR1 – Written Questions (parliamentary questions) 
Parliamentary questions are represented by MEPs to other European Union 
Institutions and bodies. These questions are considered as parliamentary inspection of 
other EU institutions and bodies (TERM:2014). MEPs can use parliamentary questions 
to improve their public image and reputation among relevant groups (party, constituency, 
interest groups). For those MEPs that belong to national opposition parties can use 
questions to inform the Commission about potential violation of certain rights by their 
own countries (Sozzi 2016:349).   
ATR2 – Motions (motions for resolutions) 
Motions of resolutions are usually tabled by a committee, a political group or at 
least 40 MEPs. The part-session agenda demonstrates whether statements by the Council, 
the Commission or the European Council (Rule 123), and oral questions to the Council 
and the Commission (Rule 128), will be followed by a vote on a motion for a resolution. 
Debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 135), 
among others, may end up with a resolution (TERM:2014). When adopting reports the 
committee comprises a motion of resolution, which can be debated and voted on in the 
plenary sessions (Europarl1:2018).  
ATR3 – Speeches (speeches in the plenary) 
Parliament meets in plenary session every month (except August) in Strasbourg, 
for a ‘part-session’ lasting four days. Six times a year, it also meets in Brussels for two 
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days (TERM:2014). During these plenary sessions MEPs can present their policy agenda. 
The right to speak out is given by the President of the European Parliament. During the 
sitting, the President calls upon speakers and ensures that the proceedings are properly 
conducted (Europarl5:2018).  
ATR4 – Opinions (opinions as a Rapporteur) 
If a committee assumes that matters discussed by a report refers to another 
committee it can request to be recognized as ‘opinion-giving committee’ (Rule 53) 
(Europarl3:2018). Opinions consist of amendments to the text referred to the committee 
followed where needed by short justifications given by the rapporteur. Opinions are 
usually given to documents of a legislative nature (TERM:2014).  
ATR5 – Opinions shadow (Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur)  
The same as for reports also for opinions as the shadow rapporteur must follow 
up the progress of the opinions of the rapporteur (TERM:2014) (Costello, Thomson 
2010:222). 
ATR6 – Declarations (written declarations) 
A written declaration is a text of a maximum of 200 words, which relates on 
matters in connection with the competence of the European Union. These matters do not 
apply to the Parliament, because those are not considered as an act of the Parliament 
representing its position. It only shows the positions of its authors and signatories 
(TERM:2014).  
ATR7– Reports (reports as a Rapporteur)  
The main task of a rapporteur is to create a report (TERM:2014). These reports 
contain proposals for resolutions or legislative amendments that are put on vote for the 
entire Parliament. Reports are usually known by the names of the MEPs who draft and 
present them, for example, “the Spinneli report” (Europarl1: 2018). Once a draft report 
has been amended and a final vote taken in the committee, it becomes a report and is then 
presented in the plenary session (TERM:2014). This role has been rewarded with a high 
importance in the Parliament and MEPs that write the reports are known by the French 
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term “rapporteur” (Europarl1:2018). The rapporteur's main task is to analyze the project, 
consult with specialists in the particular field and with those who could be affected, have 
discussion with other members of the Parliament and propose the political path to be 
followed (Europarl1:2018). Drafting and amending reports has a serious impact on 
shaping and adjusting policies at the EU level (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). Lyder 
Hermansen (2014) has found out that drafting reports increases the chance that a MEP could 
be re-elected in the EP – the more reports a MEP drafts, the more likely the chance to change 
opinions and influence the legislative outcome (Frech 2015: 74). 
ATR8 – Reports shadow (reports as a Shadow Rapporteur) 
The shadow rapporteur is chosen by the EP political groups for each report. The 
main duties of a shadow rapporteur are to follow the progress of the report and to have 
discussions with the committee and the rapporteur in order to reach compromises on 
behalf of the particular political group (TERM:2014). It is of a high importance for the 
shadow rapporteur to reach compromise on the legislative proposal (Europarl2:2018). 
European Parliament party groups that do not have the rapporteur ship on a legislative 
proposal nominate one of their members to act as shadow rapporteur, to monitor the work 
of the main committee rapporteur (Costello, Thomson 2010:222).  
ATR9 – Report amendments  
At the time when a draft report has been submitted to the committee, members 
of the committee are given the opportunity to submit amendments. The committee then 
sets a deadline when all amendments should be signed in. Afterwards proposed 
amendments are discussed and voted upon in the committee meeting. If an amendment is 
adopted, then it is included in the draft text (Europarl4).  
2.6. Division of MEPs in four types of parliamentary activities  
As discussed in the chapter (Chapter 1) about MEPs parliamentary preferences 
in the EP in this research there will be used the division of MEPs into four types of 
parliamentary activities based on the research by Bíró-Nagy (2016), where he examines 
role orientations of Central European MEPs based on different socio-demographic 
factors and on documented parliamentary activities. The certain research is chosen due 
to several reasons, one of the reasons being that all of the Central and Eastern European 
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countries chosen by Bíró-Nagy (2016) accessed the EU on the same year (2004). Another 
reason would be that by several scholars in their research the Baltic states have been 
grouped together with other CEE countries (Bochasler 2005, Nyćkowiak 2014, Grotz 
and Weber 2012). The division into 4 types of parliamentary activities will be also 
applied for the 6 EU founding states.  
While Bíró-Nagy (2016) in his research focuses on different variables as the 
time spent in the EP, age, previous political experience, party affiliation, left-right self-
definition and career ambitions, the aim of this research is to focus on the part of his 
research where he examines the officially documented activities inside the European 
Parliament. Nevertheless, work conducted outside of the EP could be essential when 
speaking about MEPs role orientation, but to evaluate the work conducted outside of the 
EP one has to create a survey with questions that would be related with this dimension 
of MEPs daily duties outside the EP. These results can also turn out to be biased as MEPs 
are themselves asked to provide certain numbers of meetings that they have had on 
monthly/daily basis, for example, with individual citizens, organized interests’ groups, 
lobbyists and journalists (Bíró-Nagy 2016:21-22). A survey would have complemented 
this research, but as Bíró-Nagy mentions that the expected MEPs respond rates can vary 
and for his research it was 40% of all Central European MEPs, while the European 
Parliamentary Research Group’s 2010 MEP survey included only 4 out of 22 surveys 
with Hungarian representatives (Bíró-Nagy 2016:5).  
The aim for this research is to divide the Baltic states MEPs into four divisions 
of parliamentary activities – policy-related and politics-type – as given by Bíró-Nagy 
(2016) to examine the preferences of parliamentary activities for the CEE and WE 
countries and the Baltic states MEPs.  
In order to divide MEPs of the Baltic states in 4 divisions of preferences as given 
by Bíró-Nagy there will be used the officially documented data about MEPs 
parliamentary activities from the website Mepranking.eu, which monitors MEPs daily 
parliamentary activities in the EP. From the website will be chosen such parliamentary 
genres as Speeches in the Plenary, Motions for Resolutions, Parliamentary Questions, 
Written Declarations, reports, opinions and amendments. For these parameters will be 
calculated the mean and standard deviation for each MEP of the Baltic States. This 
follows the method used by Bíró-Nagy, who calculates the average grade for the MEPs 
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of the Central and Eastern Europe in the aforementioned parameters. The specific 
parameters will be chosen due to the fact that Bíró-Nagy in his research has described 
which of the parliamentary activities are characteristic for the certain group of MEPs.  
If in the case of Bíró-Nagy’s research parliamentary activities are attached to a 
certain role, in this research based on the results in each of the 9 parameters will be 
chosen the most suitable type of parliamentary activity for each MEP of the Baltic states.  
In the following table there are showed the two divisions of MEP parliamentary 
activities – policy-related and politics-type. As Bíró-Nagy (2016) has only in his research 
provided data for 7 parameters in this research will be provided data for 9 parameters 
instead of 7, as reports and opinions can be written both by a Rapporteur and a Shadow 
Rapporteur. 
Table 2.4 Division of 9 parameters into policy-related and politics-type parliamentary 
activities 
Policy-related parliamentary 
activities 
Politics-type parliamentary 
activities 
Reports as a Rapporteur Speeches in the plenary 
Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur Motions for resolutions 
Opinions as a Rapporteur Parliamentary questions (PQs) 
Opinions as a Shadow 
Rapporteur 
Written declarations 
Reports amended - 
 
The division of parliamentary activities preferences by the Baltic states MEPs as 
given by Bíró-Nagy (2016) will be later discussed in the empirical part. The 9 parameters 
will be divided in 4 groups using the framework of Bíró-Nagy (2016).  
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3. Analysis of the activism of MEPs representing CEE and Western European 
countries 
The following empirical part of the thesis provides graphs of results about 9 
parliamentary activities. The first 9 graphs calculate the EU average for the certain 
parameter. MEPs representing CEE and the 6 EU founding states (later WE countries) 
are divided by color – WE are in blue and CEE are in green. The final graph – Graph 10 
– calculates the activism of CEE and WE, and the same color coding from the previous 
nine Graphs also applies there. After the description of every graph, the section ends with 
a conclusion of the presented results.  
Graph 1 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Parliamentary Questions (PQs) 
 
According to the results displayed in the Graph 1 the EU average in the 
parliamentary activity of Parliamentary Questions is 82,37. Based on the results in Graph 
1, the WE countries that show results above the EU average are Belgium (143,00) and 
Italy (121,45). None of the CEE countries are showing results in this parameter above 
the EU average. Closest results among CEE countries to the mean are Hungary (65,50) 
and Slovakia (60,31). Results that are the lowest among WE countries are for Germany 
(23,48) and Luxembourg (12,00), but for CEE countries the lowest results are for Poland 
and Latvia. Referring to the highest results in the parameter among all WE and CEE 
countries the three highest resulting countries are Belgium (143,00), Italy (121,45) and 
France (69,66), while the lowest results among WE and CEE countries in this parameter 
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are for Poland (29,56), Germany (23,48) and Luxembourg (12,00). It is possible to 
conclude from this data that among countries that show the best results in this parameter 
are WE countries and among the countries of the lowest results are as well two WE and 
one CEE country. The results of the CEE countries in this parameter are very close to 
each other in the range of starting from 29,56 to 65,50.  
Parliamentary questions are represented by MEPs to other European Union 
Institutions and bodies. These questions are considered as parliamentary inspection of 
other EU institutions and bodies (TERM:2014). MEPs can use parliamentary questions 
to improve their public image and reputation among relevant groups (party, constituency, 
interest groups) (Sozzi 2016:349). According to scholars Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) 
parliamentary questions can be used for different purposes, which includes receiving and 
sending information to other EU institutions, raising issue awareness and inspecting the 
Commissioners (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). 
Graph 2 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Motions for Resolutions 
 
Displayed in Graph 2, the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Motions 
for Resolutions is 86,13. From the results in Graph 2 only one WE country shows results 
above the EU average - Belgium (140,81). Amongst the CEE countries with results above 
the EU average are the Czech Republic (171,68), Lithuania (153,00), Slovenia (152,25) 
and Slovakia (107,23). Results that are the lowest below the EU average for WE 
countries are found with France (35,55), Germany (32,60) and Luxembourg (16,00). 
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Amidst the CEE countries the lowest results that are below the EU average are for 
Hungary (32,20), Latvia (42,33) and Poland (61,60). The three highest resulting 
countries are the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania, while the lowest results are 
for France, Hungary and Luxembourg. Overall from the data visible in Graph 2 it is 
noticeable that amongst the top countries in this parameter are all CEE countries and 
among the lowest resulting are two WE and one CEE country. The results displayed in 
this graph show that the results vary from one country to another, which shows that there 
is not a clear dominance of the certain parameter amongst WE or CEE countries.  
Motions of resolutions are usually tabled by a committee, a political group or at 
least 40 MEPs (TERM:2014). According to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) motions for 
resolutions are normally used by MEPs to raise awareness or to prompt the Commission 
to act (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). In addition, motions for resolutions, speeches in the 
plenary and parliamentary questions are the parliamentary activities that MEPs prefer to 
do in the EP (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:9).  
Graph 3 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Speeches in the Plenary 
 
According to the results presented in Graph 3, the EU average in the 
parliamentary activity of Speeches in the Plenary is 330,78. The WE countries that show 
results above the mean are Belgium (385,31), France (360,81) and Italy (343,02), but in 
contrast several CEE countries are above the mean – Hungary (375,70), Lithuania 
(456,80), Slovenia (580,38) and Slovakia (464,38). Results that are the lowest below the 
385.31 360.81
91.42
343.02
37.75
79.57
306.47
364.00 375.70
206.50
456.80
124.87
464.38
580.38
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
BE FR DE IT LU NL CZ EE HU LV LT PL SL SI
Speeches in the Parliament (WE and CEE)
SPEECHES EU AVERAGE
41  
EU average concerning WE countries are for Germany (91,42), Luxembourg (37,75) and 
the Netherlands (79,57). In terms of CEE countries, the lowest results that are below the 
mean are for the Czech Republic (306,47), Estonia (364,00), Latvia (206,50) and Poland 
(124,87). Looking at the highest results of the parameter, the three highest resulting 
countries are Slovenia, Slovakia and Lithuania, while the lowest are Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Germany. It is safe to conclude from the data that CEE countries 
dominate this parameter in terms of the research. While some countries are close to the 
mean result, surprisingly mostly WE countries are displaying poor results in this activity.  
According to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) plenary speeches enable MEPs to 
make their positions public and to communicate their views to their national party, their 
European group and to their constituencies back home (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). 
During these plenary sessions MEPs can present their policy agenda (Europarl5:2018). 
Graph 4 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Opinions as a Rapporteur 
 
When referring to the results in Graph 4 the EU average in the parliamentary 
activity of Opinions as a Rapporteur is 1,86. 
From the results it can be discerned that the countries above the EU average are 
Belgium (2,25), the Czech Republic (2,74), Italy (2,27) and Poland (2,02), while 10 
countries are below the mean. WE and CEE countries that are the closest to the mean are 
2.25
1.50 1.60
2.27
1.50
1.00
2.74
1.75
1.20
0.83
1.20
2.02
1.54
0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
BE FR DE IT LU NL CZ EE HU LV LT PL SL SI
Opinions as a Rapporteur (WE and CEE)
OPINIONS EU AVERAGE
42  
Estonia and Slovakia. In conclusion, two WE countries and two CEE countries have the 
highest results in this parameter, while the opposite is true for the lowest scoring 
countries A common denominator for most of the WE and CEE countries is that the 
results in this parameter are below the EU average. This could be expected as not all of 
the MEPs are granted a rapporteur ship in the EP.  
Opinions consist of amendments to the text referred to the committee followed 
where needed by short justifications given by the rapporteur. Opinions are usually given 
to documents of a legislative nature (TERM:2014) The findings of this research can be 
complemented with the findings of Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) as they mention that 
MEPs draft on average far fewer reports than they amend, and they deliver an even 
smaller number of opinions (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:8).  
Graph 5 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Opinions as a Shadow rapporteur 
 
As shown in Graph 5 the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Opinions 
as a Shadow Rapporteur is 9,40. From the results it can be discerned that in Graph 5 the 
countries above the EU average are Italy (12,38), the Czech Republic (15,05), 
Luxembourg (11,50) and Estonia (20,75), while Lithuania (8,90) is the closest to the 
mean from the other countries. In conclusion, the highest resulting countries in this 
parameter are two CEE and two WE countries. While the CEE countries display greater 
variety, the WE country block is more consistent. Apparently, the MEPs that represent 
the Czech Republic and Estonia are active in the role of a Shadow Rapporteur.  
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The same as for reports also for opinions as the shadow rapporteur must follow 
up the progress of the opinions of the rapporteur (TERM:2014) (Costello, Thomson 
2010:222). 
Graph 6 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Written declarations 
 
The EU average in the parliamentary activity of Written Declarations is 5,19. 
Countries above the mean are Belgium, Italy, the Czech Republic, Lithuania (just 
slightly), Slovakia and Slovenia, which also displays the highest result in this parameter 
in terms of this research. All other countries are below the mean and show great variety 
in terms of results, as no country block shows immediate dominance over the other. 
Overall from the data it can be discerned that CEE countries have higher results in this 
parameter when averaged. The results displayed show that among all WE and CEE 
countries is one country that has outstanding results – Slovenia. MEPs of Slovenia are 
one of the most active writers of written declarations in the entire EP. 
A written declaration is a text of a maximum of 200 words, which relates on 
matters in connection with the competence of the European Union. These matters do not 
apply to the Parliament, because those are not considered as an act of the Parliament 
representing its position. It only shows the positions of its authors and signatories 
(TERM:2014). According to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) written declarations the same 
as motions for resolutions are usually used to raise awareness or to prompt the 
Commission to act (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6).  
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Graph 7 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Reports as a Rapporteur 
 
When referring to the results depicted in Graph 7, the EU average in the 
parliamentary activity of Reports as a Rapporteur is 2,34. 
The countries that show results above the mean are Belgium (5,31), the Czech 
Republic (3,00), Estonia (5,25), Poland (3,18) and Slovenia (2,38), showing a clear 
advantage for CEE countries. The rest of the countries are below the mean with Lithuania 
showing the lowest result. The analysis of the graph shows how both WE and CEE 
countries display competent results, with CEE displaying greater variety, with four 
countries being above the mean and the other four being below. Despite only Belgium 
and Luxembourg being above the mean, the rest of the WE countries are relatively close 
by to each other, showing a modicum of some consistency and similar activity. 
Interestingly countries such as Lithuania and Slovakia, which have high scores 
in the other parameters, show low results in this parameter, while Latvia has a relatively 
better result than in other parameters.  
The main task of a rapporteur is to create a report (TERM 2014). These reports 
contain proposals for resolutions or legislative amendments that are put on vote for the 
entire Parliament. Once a draft report has been amended and a final vote taken in the 
committee, it becomes a report and is then presented in the plenary session (TERM 
2014). This role has been rewarded with a high importance in the Parliament and MEPs 
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that write the reports are known by the French term “rapporteur” (Europarl1:2018). The 
rapporteur's main task is to analyze the project, consult with specialists in the particular 
field and with those who could be affected, have discussion with other members of the 
Parliament and propose the political path to be followed (Europarl1:2018). The findings 
of this research can be complemented with the findings of Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) 
as they mention that drafting and amending reports has a serious impact on shaping and 
adjusting policies at the EU level (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). Robert Van Geffen 
mentions that a MEP with a domestic political background might be better positioned to 
take on certain rapporteur ships which could increase his ability to build a career in the 
EP. MEPs with a domestic political background are more likely to enter at a higher level 
in the EP, with a better chance of getting a high-profile rapporteur ships or senior 
positions (Geffen 2016:1021).  
Graph 8 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur 
 
When referring to the results depicted in Graph 8 the EU average in the 
parliamentary activity of Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur is 12,86. 
The countries that show results above the EU average are Belgium (13,13), Italy 
(16,97), the Netherlands (19,35), the Czech Republic (18,44), Estonia (23,00) and 
Slovakia (25,31). The rest of the countries show results below the mean with Latvia 
showing the lowest results. Once again, the data provides variety between both groups 
and within these groups. Seemingly at first notice the CEE countries appear to perform 
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slightly better than their WE colleagues, however, the high result of Slovakia is definitely 
one of key factors as to why on average the CEE countries may overtake WE countries 
in this parameter. The findings show that the three highest resulting and the bottom three 
countries are from the same groups as it is for the parameter of reports as a Rapporteur. 
In Graph 8 it is visible that two countries stand out from all others – Slovakia and Latvia. 
While for Slovakia in this particular parameter is a high result that stands out, for Latvia 
the result is in fact the opposite as the result is remarkably lower than for all other CEE 
and WE countries. This could be related with Latvia having relatively high results in the 
parameter of Reports as a Rapporteur.  
The shadow rapporteur is chosen by the EP political groups for each report. The 
main duties of a shadow rapporteur are following the progress of the report and to have 
discussions with the committee and the rapporteur in order to reach compromises on 
behalf of the particular political group (TERM:2014). It is of a high importance for the 
shadow rapporteur to reach compromise on the legislative proposal (Europarl2:2018). 
European Parliament party groups that do not have the rapporteur ship on a legislative 
proposal nominate one of their members to act as shadow rapporteur, to monitor the work 
of the main committee rapporteur (Costello, Thomson 2010:222). 
Graph 9 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in the parameter of 
Report amendments 
 
As displayed in Graph 9 the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Report 
amendments is 537,33. In total four WE countries show results above the EU average, 
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while only the Czech Republic displays results above the mean from the CEE countries. 
Comparing to some of the previous parameters, the CEE countries are certainly lacking 
behind WE countries in terms of activity, and seemingly by a considerable margin. This 
echoes the results of the mean in this parameter where WE countries show higher results 
and CEE countries are mostly positioned below. It is also noticeable how most of the 
CEE country results are even lower than WE country results that are below the mean as 
well. 
At the time when a draft report has been submitted to the committee, members 
of the committee are given the opportunity to submit amendments (Europarl4:2018). 
According to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) the parameter of reports amended is of a 
second order as it does not make a difference to the re-nomination of the MEP in the EP 
(Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:8). Nevertheless Robert Van Geffen (2016) mentions that MEPs 
who do not have a long-term career in the EP are more likely to submit amendments to 
reports than MEPs who wish to pursue a career in the EP. MEPs who pursue their career 
in the EP are possibly more often the rapporteurs themselves. They would therefore be 
less likely to submit amendments to reports (Geffen 2016:1027). 
Graph 10 Results of WE and CEE countries and the EU average in activism 
 
The results of Graph 10 are calculated by using the activism measurement 
formula. The overall activism is calculated for 9 parameters that measure the 
parliamentary activities of MEPs in the EP. According to the results displayed in Graph 
13, the EU average activism is 1.00. The countries above the mean are Belgium (1,36), 
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Italy (1,25), the Czech Republic (1,31), Estonia (1,44), and Slovenia (1,22). Slovakia has 
the same result as the EU average (1,00). Overall only two from six WE countries are 
showing results above the EU average, while from the CEE countries 3 out of 8 countries 
are showing results above the EU average and one is showing a result which is the same 
as the EU average. From these results regarding the activism of MEPs in the EP we can 
conclude that the most active group are CEE countries with Estonia (1,44) having the 
best scores overall in all of the 10 activism measurement parameters. From the 6 EU 
founding states the most active MEPs as according to the results in the 10 parliamentary 
activities have Belgium and Italy, while the rest of the 4 countries show relatively low 
results that are below the EU average activism mean. The lowest activism amongst MEPs 
are for the following countries: Germany (0,56), Latvia (0,49) and Luxembourg (0,61).  
From all three Baltic states the most active MEPs in the 10 parliamentary 
activities have: Estonia (1.44). As the next follows Lithuania with a result close to the 
EU average (0,91). From the Baltic states the least active MEPs regarding the activism 
measurement of 10 parameters are from Latvia (0,49), with result that is below the EU 
average activism mean. 
3.1. Conclusion of analysis of the activism of MEPs representing CEE and 
Western European countries 
According to the results regarding the parliamentary activities of MEPs 
representing CEE and Western European countries (the 6 EU founding countries) it is 
noticeable that the CEE countries outperform the WE countries when looking at the 
overall activism in the 9 parameters that measure the parliamentary activities of MEPs 
in the EP. This shows that despite the fact that the CEE countries have joined the EU 
only in 2004 most of these countries MEPs devote a lot of energy to show to their peers 
in the EP and to their national constituencies that they are elected in the EP for a reason. 
Behind the relatively low results of activism in the EP for 4 out of 6 WE countries could 
be the reason that from these countries many MEPs have high positions in Committees 
and other EP structures therefore they lack spare time to devote their energy for the 
certain parliamentary activities in the EP. 
When comparing the CEE countries that accessed the EU in 2004 to the Baltic 
states it is visible that in some parameters the results are similar for both groups, while 
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in other all three groups WE, CEE and the Baltic states MEPs share similar voting 
patterns. In parameters such as parliamentary questions (see Graph 1), speeches in the 
plenary (see Graph 3), opinions as a Rapporteur (see Graph 4), opinions as a Shadow 
Rapporteur (see Graph 5) and report amendments (see Graph 9) there is visible that CEE 
countries and the Baltic states share similar voting patterns with some countries as 
exceptions that have results higher than the EU average and countries that show lower 
than the EU average. In all other parameters that are not mentioned results differ from 
one country to another and it is hard to find any common denominator among the groups 
of countries. The certain pattern can be visible also in the activism measurement of MEPs 
representing WE and CEE countries (see Graph 10). 
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4. Analysis of the activism of MEPs representing the Baltic States 
The following empirical part of the thesis provides Graphs of results about 9 
parliamentary activities. The first 9 Graphs there calculate the EU average for the certain 
parameter. Baltic state MEPs are divided into their respective countries by color in the 
Graph – Estonian MEPs are in blue, Latvian MEPs are in red, and Lithuanian MEPs are 
in green. The final Graph – Graph 23 – calculates the activism of Baltic state MEPs, and 
the same color coding from the previous twelve Graphs also applies there. After the 
description of every Graph, the section ends with a conclusion of the presented results. 
As per the limitation of the common attribute described in section 2.2., the time 
spent in the EP has to be equal among all MEPs eligible for analysis. The data represented 
in the analysis is for the time period of 1st of July 2014 to 31st of October 2018, with the 
former being the common attribute for all MEPs. At this moment, the MEPs that 
represent Estonia are 6 (Igor Gräzin, Ivari Padar, Tunne Kelam, Urmas Paet, Indrek 
Tarand, Yana Toom), the MEPs that represent Latvia are 8 (Iveta Grigule-Pēterse, Sandra 
Kalniete, Krišjānis Kariņš, Andrejs Mamikins, Miroslavs Mitrofanovs, Inese Vaidere, 
Roberts Zīle, Kārlis Šadurskis), and the MEPs that represent Lithuania are 11 (Laima 
Liucija Andrikienė, Petras Auštrevičius, Zigmantas Balčytis, Vilija 
Blinkevičiūtė,Antanas Guoga, Valentinas Mazuronis, Rolandas Paksas, Bronis Ropė, 
Algirdas Saudargas, Valdemar Tomaševski, Viktor Uspaskich ). In total, the Baltic States 
are represented by 25 MEPs. However, by utilizing the common attribute, the following 
MEPs are not included within the analysis: Igor Gräzin (EE), Ivari Padar (EE), Inese 
Vaidere (LV), Tatjana Ždanoka (LV) and Laima Liucija Andrikienė (LT). This excludes 
five of the total 25 Baltic MEPs, as their results are not comparable to their colleagues 
that have served in the EP longer. 
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Graph 11 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Parliamentary Questions 
(PQs) 
 
Graph 11 displays the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Parliamentary 
Questions as 73,33. The results show that among all MEPs representing the Baltic states 
above the EU average are Paet (165), Mamikins (152), Balčytis (92), Blinkevičiūtė (177), 
and Ropė (109). All others (15) representing Baltic states are showing results below the 
EU average. The closest results to the EU average are for Auštrevičius (70) and Paksas 
(60). The MEPs with the highest score in the particular parameter are Paet (165), 
Mamikins (152) and Blinkevičiūtė (177), however, the lowest scores are for Zīle (2), 
Saudargas (2) and Pabriks (6). 
It is possible to conclude from this data that from each of the Baltic states there 
is at least one MEP that shows high levels of activism in this parameter. For most of the 
MEPs the results are under the EU average, which shows that MEPs of the Baltic states 
are not the most active here. Parliamentary Questions are represented by MEPs to other 
European Union Institutions and bodies. MEPs can use Parliamentary Questions to 
improve their public image and reputation among relevant groups (party, constituency, 
interest groups) (Sozzi 2016:349). As mentioned by Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) not all 
MEPs are willing to address Parliamentary Questions to other European Union 
Institutions and bodies therefore the numbers among MEPs in the EP in the certain 
parameter are not that high (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:8). 
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Graph 12 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Motions for Resolutions 
 
According to the results displayed in Graph 12, the EU average in the 
parliamentary activity of Motions for Resolutions is 67,10. Graph 12 shows MEPs 
representing the Baltic states, who are above the EU average, are the Estonian Kelam 
(346) and Paet (349), the Latvian Kalniete (153) and several Lithuanian representatives 
– Auštrevičius (339), Balčytis (175), Blinkevičiūtė (211), Guoga (92), Mazuronis (262), 
Paksas (176), Ropė (123) and Tomaševski (131). Amongst the MEPs of the Baltic states 
the highest score in this particular parameter belongs to Auštrevičius (339), Kelam (346) 
and Paet (349). The lowest scores are for Grigule-Pēterse (3), Saudragas (3) and Kariņš 
(5). From the Baltic states in this particular parliamentary activity the best results belong 
to two Estonian MEPs and one Lithuanian MEP, but the lowest scoring MEPs are two 
Latvian MEPs and one Lithuanian MEP. A common denominator in this parameter is 
that most of the MEPs representing Lithuania show results that are above the EU average, 
which means that MEPs representing Lithuania are eager to devote their energy when it 
comes to the parliamentary activity of tabling Motions for Resolutions.  
Motions for Resolutions are usually tabled by a committee, a political group or 
at least 40 MEPs (TERM:2014). According to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) Motions for 
Resolutions are normally used by MEPs to raise awareness or to prompt the Commission 
to act (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). In addition, Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the 
Plenary and Parliamentary Questions are the parliamentary activities that MEPs prefer 
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to do in the EP, which explains the overall levels of activism of the Baltic states MEPs 
in this parameter (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:9).  
Graph 13 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Speeches in the Plenary 
 
In Graph 13 the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Speeches in the 
Plenary is 283,08. Based on the results in Graph 13 the MEPs representing the Baltic 
states that are above the EU average are Paet (978), Mamikins (929) Balčytis (944), 
Blinkevičiūtė (1064), Guoga (632), Mazuronis (308), Paksas (403) and Ropė (582). The 
MEPs closest to the EU average are Kelam (234), Auštrevičius (236) and Uspaskich 
(236). Amongst the MEPs of the Baltic states the highest score in this particular 
parameter belongs to Blinkevičiūtė (1064), Paet (978) and Balčytis (944). The lowest 
scores are for Grigule-Pēterse (5), Pabriks (29) and Saudargas (39). From the Baltic states 
in this particular parliamentary activity the best results belong to two MEPs representing 
Lithuania and one MEP representing Estonia, but from the lowest scoring MEPs two are 
Latvian and one is Lithuanian. While among the MEPs that have been in the EP since 
the starting of the term in 2014 the lowest result among all of the Baltic states MEPs 
belongs Grigule-Pēterse (5).  
According to the results it is noticeable that in this parameter several MEPs 
representing Latvia show lower results than their peers from Estonia and Lithuania. 
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According to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) Speeches in the Plenary enable MEPs 
to make their positions public and to communicate their views to their national party, 
their European group and to their constituencies back home (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). 
When refering to this assumption it can be concluded that those MEPs that show higher 
results can bring out more of the policy agenda of their represented constituency. 
Graph 14 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Opinions as a Rapporteur 
 
In Graph 14 the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Opinions as a 
Rapporteur is 1,86. Based on the results in the Graph 14 the MEPs representing the Baltic 
states that are above the EU average are Tarand (5), Toom (2), Mamikins (2), Zīle (2), 
Balčytis (4) and Blinkevičiūtė (6). Only 3 more MEPs have written at least one opinion 
as a Rapporteur. All other MEPs (11) are showing results below the EU average and have 
not written any Opinions as a Rapporteur. The MEPs with the highest result in this 
parameter are Blinkevičiūtė (6), Tarand (5) and Balčytis (4).  
In this parameter there are MEPs that have had the opportunity to fill the duties 
of a Rapporteur, which is considered as the the most prestigious policy role in the EP 
(Bíró-Nagy 2016:12). Rapporteurships are by definition restricted in number and 
distributed in a competitive fashion (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:8). Opinions consist of 
amendments to the text referred to the committee followed where needed by short 
justifications given by the rapporteur. Opinions are usually given to documents of a 
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legislative nature (TERM 2014). Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) mention that MEPs draft 
on average far fewer reports than they amend, and they deliver an even smaller number 
of opinions (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:8). According to the results depicted in Graph 14 the 
assumption of Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) proves to be true.  
Graph 15 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Opinions as a Shadow 
Rapporteur 
 
In Graph 15 the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Opinions as a 
Shadow Rapporteur is 8,59. Among all of the MEPs representing the Baltic states that 
are above the EU average are Paet (25), Tarand (20), Toom (36), Zīle (21), Blinkevičiūtė 
(15), Paksas (14), Ropė (22) and Uspaskich (9). The other 12 representatives are below 
the EU average. Results closest to the EU average are for Auštrevičius (7), Balčytis (7), 
Guoga (8) and Uspaskich (9). The best results in this parameter are expressed by Toom 
(36), Paet (25) and Ropė (22). The lowest scores are for Grigule-Pēterse (0), Pabriks (0) 
and Tomaševski (0).  
According to the results, the highest results are shown by 3 MEPs representing 
Estonia, and 4 MEPs representing Lithuania are above the EU average. The lowest results 
are for MEPs that represent Latvia, but the only Latvian MEP that has a result above the 
EU average is Zīle (21).  
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If compared to the parameter of Opinions as a Rapporteur, then the Baltic MEPs 
usually allocate themselves for the position of a Shadow Rapporteur. MEPs having this 
position have to follow up the progress of the opinions of the rapporteur (TERM 2014). 
The vast difference in the results could be associated with the complexity of creating 
Opinions as a Rapporteur and with the fact that most of the MEPs have not been 
nominated as Rapporteurs to deal with such tasks.  
Graph 16 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Written Declarations 
 
In Graph 16 the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Written 
Declarations is 4,08. Based on the results in the graph, MEPs representing the Baltic 
states that are above the EU average are: Tarand (6), Toom (6), Auštrevičius (8), Balčytis 
(12), Blinkevičiūtė (4), Guoga (8) and Ropė (5). Results below the mean are shown by 
13 out of 20 MEPs representing the Baltic states. Results closest to the EU average 
amongst the MEPs are displayed by Kelam (4), Blinkevičiūtė (4), Kariņš (3) and 
Mazuronis (3). The best results in the parameter of Written Declarations are expressed 
by Balčytis (12), Paksas (11), Auštrevičius (8) and Guoga (8). The lowest scores are for 
Grigule-Pēterse (0), Tomaševski (0) and Uspaskich (0).  
MEPs representing Lithuania outperform their peers from Estonia and Latvia. 
In general, the lowest results among all three Baltic states are for Latvian representatives. 
Accroding to Sigalas and Tiemann (2012) Written Declarations are usually used to raise 
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awareness or to prompt the Commission to act (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). These matters 
do not apply to the Parliament, because those are not considered as an act of the 
Parliament representing its position. It only shows the positions of its authors and 
signatories (TERM 2014). 
Graph 17 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Reports as a Rapporteur 
 
Graph 17 presents the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Reports as a 
Rapporteur as 2,26. Among all of the MEPs representing the Baltic states above, the 
individuals above the EU average are Paet (4), Tarand (16), Kariņš (4), Zīle (3) and 
Auštrevičius (3). The MEPs with the closest results to the mean belong to Kalniete (2), 
Mamikins (2), Pabriks (2) and Paksas (2). The best results in this parameter are displayed 
by Tarand (16), Paet (4) and Kariņš (4). The lowest scores are for Kelam (0), Grigule-
Pēterse (0), Guoga (0), Mazuronis (0), Ropė (0) and Tomaševski (0).  
Drafting and amending reports has been considered as one of the main processes 
for shaping and adjusting policies at the EU level (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). Non-
legislative reports also are essential, because these are written by the Rapporteur, who is 
the main person for the Commission and for all the other institutions and groups, which 
need to coordinate this procedure.  
In this particular parameter MEPs representing Estonia and Latvia outperform 
MEPs that represent Lithuania. From all MEPs that represent the Baltic states in the EP, 
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there is one MEP that has an outstanding result – Indrek Tarand. He has created 16 
reports, which greatly exceeds the the EU average of 2 reports per MEP. This could 
justify lower results in all other parameters as creating report is time consuming and 
involves discussions within and outside the EP with different groups that could be 
affected (Europarl 4:2018). Another common denominator for the certain parameter is 
that MEPs representing Latvia overall have the highest results as a group in this 
parameter, while in other parameters MEPs that represent Latvia are underperforming if 
compared to MEPs that represent Estonia and Lithuania. Results of MEPs of the Baltic 
states in this certain parameter are of a high importance as drafting reports has a serious 
impact on shaping and adjusting policies at the EU level (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). 
Being a rapporteur puts even more pressure to a MEP as his or her main task is to analyze 
the project, consult with specialists in the particular field and with those who could be 
affected, have discussion with other members of the Parliament and propose the political 
path to be followed (Europarl 4:2018). All these aforementioned activities are time 
consuming therefore those MEPs that have granted a rapporteurship can be more 
occupied and in other parameters would show lower results than their peers who are not 
granted rapporteur ship (Hix et al. 2007:61). 
Graph 18 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Reports as a Shadow 
Rapporteur 
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Graph 18 presents the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Reports as a 
Shadow Rapporteur as 11,39. MEPs representing the Baltic states that are above the EU 
average are Tarand (67), Zīle (14), Paksas (31), Ropė (16) and Balčytis (11), and the 
other 15 out of 20 MEPs are below it. Results closest to the EU average are for Paet (10) 
and Toom (9). The best results in this parameter are shown by Tarand (67), Paksas (31) 
and Ropė (16), while the lowest results are presented by Kalniete (0), Mazuronis (0) and 
Tomaševski (0). The results in this parameter are very similar, the only MEP that stands 
out the same as in the previous parameter is Indrek Tarand. He has a strong position as a 
policy maker as in both parameters that are made by a Rapporteur he has results that 
exceed the results of most of the MEPs in the EP as he shows results that are greater than 
the EU average.  
The shadow rapporteur is chosen by the EP political groups for each report. The 
main duties of a shadow rapporteur are to follow the progress of the report and to have 
discussions with the committee and the rapporteur in order to reach compromises on 
behalf of the particular political group (TERM 2014). It is of a high importance for the 
shadow rapporteur to reach compromise on the legislative proposal (Europarl 5:2018).  
Graph 19 The Baltic MEP and EU average in the parameter of Reports Amended 
 
Graph 19 shows the EU average in the parliamentary activity of Reports 
Amended as 536,48. MEPs representing the Baltic states that are above the EU average 
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are Paet (1084), Kariņš (643), Auštrevičius (1205), Balčytis (652), Blinkevičiūtė (512), 
Ropė (614), while the other 14 representatives are below the mean. Results closest to the 
EU average are for Toom (530), Blinkevičiūtė (512) and Guoga (486). The highest 
results in this parameter belongs to Paet (1084), Auštrevičius (1205) and Balčytis (652), 
while the lowest results are displayed by Grigule-Pēterse (0) and Uspaskich (11).  
There are two MEPs that have outstanding results in this – Paet (1084) and 
Auštrevičius (1205). Lithuanian MEPs are outperforming Estonian and Latvian MEPs, 
while in the Reports as a Rapporteur, Lithuanian MEPs are showing lower results than 
their peers. It can be explained by the fact that MEPs seeking a career in the EP are more 
likely to be Rapporteurs themselves, therefore they would submit less amendments to 
reports (Geffen 2016:1027). For MEPs that are not granted a rapporteur ship, tabling 
amendments is the main way to influence legislation (Geffen 2016:1028) 
Graph 20 Activism of MEPs representing the Baltic states 
 
The results of Graph 20 are calculated by using the activism measurement 
formula. The overall activism is calculated for 9 parameters that measure the 
parliamentary activities of MEPs (Reports as a Rapporteur, Reports as a Shadow 
Rapporteur, Opinions as a Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Reports 
Amended, Parliamentary Questions (PQs), Motions for Resolutions, Written 
Declarations, Speeches in the Plenary).  
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According to the results displayed in Graph 20 the EU average is 1.00. Among 
the MEPs representing the Baltic states, the individuals above the EU average are Paet 
(2,08), Tarand (2,35), Toom (1,06), Mamikins (1,05), Auštrevičius (1,59), Balčytis 
(1,75), Blinkevičiūtė (1,91), Paksas (1,51) and Ropė (1,36).The highest levels of activism 
are shown by Paet (2,08), Tarand (2,35) and Blinkevičiūtė (1,91).  
The highest levels of activism are shown by representatives of Estonia and 
Lithuania, while only one Latvian representative is above the EU average. It is noticeable 
that, despite excluding two parameters, the results are about the same as when only 
looking at the previous 9 graphs.  
4.1. Conclusion of analysis of the activism of MEPs representing the Baltic 
states 
According to the results about the 9 parliamentary activities of the Baltic state 
MEPs it is noticeable that MEPs from Estonia and Lithuania outperform MEPs from 
Latvia. The same is true also when looking at the overall activism. The least active MEP 
that started mandate on 1st of July 2014 is Grigule-Pēterse (0,03).  
Among the most active MEPs that represent the Baltic states in the EP it is 
visible that they have results above the EU average in almost all of the parameters despite 
the fact that some of the political activities that MEPs choose to devote their time are not 
as influential as others when it comes to policy change. 
  
62  
5. Analysis of the parliamentary activity preferences 
5.1. Method of classification of parliamentary activity preference 
The classification of parliamentary activity preference utilizes the framework 
by Bíró-Nagy (2016) described in detail in section 2.6. For the purposes of this research, 
the framework has been modified to include additional classification options. 
The total number of parameters used in the classification is 9 and the parameters 
that determine the classification in either Policy-oriented or Politics-type group are listed 
in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1 Division of 9 parameters into policy-related and politics-type parliamentary 
activities 
Policy-related parliamentary activities Politics-type parliamentary activities 
Reports as a Rapporteur Speeches in the plenary 
Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur Motions for resolutions 
Opinions as a Rapporteur Parliamentary questions (PQs) 
Opinions as a Shadow 
Rapporteur 
Written declarations 
Reports amended - 
 
Classification in a group depends on the number of parameters in which a 
country or a MEP has results higher than the EU average. For example, if a MEP obtains 
results in Parliamentary Questions higher than the EU average, then that counts towards 
being classified as a Politics-type MEP. The same principle applies to parameters of 
every country and MEP. 
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The framework by Bíró-Nagy (2016) is complimented by two additional 
categories for the purposes of this research: 
• The category Politics/Policy includes the countries or MEPs that 
cannot be grouped in either the Policy-oriented or Politics-type due to the results 
of countries or MEPs not clearly defining the inclusion in either of the two 
aforementioned groups. This category displays that, although a country or a 
MEP shows results higher than the EU average in some parameters, it cannot be 
conclusively grouped in either in the Policy-oriented or Politics-type groups. 
• The category Neither includes the countries or MEPs that cannot 
be grouped in either group if any of the countries or MEPs do not have any of 
the parameters higher than the EU average. 
The requirements for a country or a MEP to be classified in any of the four 
classifications are as follows: 
• To be classified in either Policy-oriented or Politics-type, the 
country or MEP in question must have results above the EU average in at least 
half, or the next closest number to the half mark, of the parameters in any 
category – in the case of Policy-oriented the number of parameters with results 
higher than the EU average has to be at least 3 and in the case of Politics-type 
the number of parameters with results higher than the EU average has to be at 
least 2. 
• To be classified in the Politics/Policy group, the country or MEP 
in question must have results above the EU average in less than half of the 
parameters in any category – in the case of Policy-oriented the number of 
parameters with results higher than the EU average has to be 2 or less or in the 
case of Politics-type the number of parameters with results higher than the EU 
average has to be 1. However, this group also contains countries or MEPs that 
have any results that are above the EU average in any of the parameters. 
Additionally, if a country or a MEP has results above the EU average in all of 
the parameters, the country or MEP in question are categorized in this group.  
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• To be classified in the Neither group, the country or MEP in 
question must show no results above the EU average in any of the parameters in 
Policy-oriented and Politics-type, signifying that these countries or MEPs 
cannot be grouped in any of the categories listed above. In other words, the result 
of all parameters must be 0. 
 
5.2. Classification of parliamentary activity preference of WE and CEE 
countries 
The table displays CEE countries and the 6 EU founding states that are divided 
into 4 types of parliamentary activities where their MEPs show results that are above the 
EU average. The EU member states that have results in all of the 9 parameters below the 
EU average are grouped in the section Neither, however, the countries with MEPs 
showing results above the EU average in parameters that are both politics and policy 
oriented are grouped in Politics/Policy oriented.  
Table 5.1 Division of countries into 4 types of parliamentary activities 
Policy–oriented Politics–type Politics/Policy oriented Neither 
Italy Belgium France Germany 
Luxembourg Lithuania The Netherlands Latvia 
The Czech 
Republic 
Slovakia Hungary  
Estonia Slovenia Poland  
 
The group Policy-oriented includes the following countries: Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Czech Republic and Estonia. MEPs representing Estonia show results above the EU 
average in Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary, Opinions as a Shadow 
Rapporteur, Reports as a Rapporteur and Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and Reports 
Amendments. According to the conclusions from the analysis in Chapter 3, it is 
reasonable to assume that MEPs representing Estonia are often granted the most 
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influential position for a MEP regarding policy making, which is being a Rapporteur. 
For a country that only has 6 MEPs in the EP it is remarkable as most of the MEPs have 
proved their eligibility for a rapporteurship, which is the most desired position amongst 
MEPs (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6). The next country with results above the EU average 
in parameters concerning policy is Luxembourg. MEPs representing Luxembourg show 
results above the EU average in Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Reports as a 
Rapporteur and Reports Amended. Another CEE country that shows results above the 
EU average is the Czech Republic, as it shows results above the EU average in Motions 
for Resolutions, Opinions as a Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Written 
Declarations, Reports as a Rapporteur, Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and Reports 
Amendments. Also, MEPs representing Italy show results above the EU average in 
various type of parliamentary activities: Parliamentary Questions, Speeches in the 
Plenary, Opinions as a Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Written 
Declarations, Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and Reports Amended. Surprisingly, the 
EU founding states in terms of policy-oriented activities seem to be lacking, which can 
be discerned from the results of the research, as these types of activities are of higher 
importance in the EP regarding policy making if compared to the political type of 
activities (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:6).These activities are also granted for MEPs that are 
more experienced in the EP according to Bíró-Nagy (2016). 
Regarding Politics-oriented, member states show high results in Motions for 
Resolutions. The high results in this parameter can be justified with this parliamentary 
activity being one of the activities that MEPs prefer to do in the parliament (Sigalas, 
Tiemann 2012:9). MEPs representing Lithuania show results above the EU average 
Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary and Written Declarations. Two of these 
– Motions for Resolutions and Speeches in the Plenary – are the most preferred 
parliamentary activities of MEPs in the EP. Another two countries that show results 
above the EU average in the politics-type of activities are Slovakia and Slovenia. Both 
countries show results above the EU average in Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the 
Plenary and Written declarations. It should be noted that Slovakia has an above-average 
result in Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and Slovenia has an above-average result in 
Reports as a Rapporteur. MEPs representing Belgium show results above the EU average 
in almost all of the 9 parliamentary activities: Parliamentary Questions, Motions for 
Resolutions, Opinions as a Rapporteur, Written declarations, Reports as a Rapporteur, 
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Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and Report Amendments. This shows that MEPs can 
have different parliamentary activity preferences and are not limiting themselves to 
either politics or policy type of activities. The results in these types of activities indicate 
that some MEPs have been granted rapporteurship and are focusing not only on political 
activities. As depicted in the table all countries that show results above the EU average 
in politics-type of parliamentary activities are CEE countries.  
The group Politics/Policy includes France, The Netherlands, Hungary and 
Poland. MEPs representing France show results above the EU average in just two 
parameters, where one is of politics-type (Speeches in the Plenary), while the other is of 
policy-type (Report Amendments). The MEPs representing the Netherlands show results 
above the EU average in two parameters, where both are of policy-oriented Reports as a 
Shadow Rapporteur and Reports Amended. From the CEE countries Poland shows 
results above the EU average in two parameters that are of policy- oriented Opinions as 
a Rapporteur and Reports as a Rapporteur. Another country that could be listed as this 
type is Hungary, as the country’s MEPs have results above the EU average in Speeches 
in the Plenary. Overall also in this category are represented two CEE and respectively 
two WE countries. Mostly these countries show results in parliamentary activities that 
are of policy-oriented. 
The group of countries that do not correspond with the requirements of the 
aforementioned 3 groups, which is appropriately named Neither, consists of Germany 
and Latvia. These countries also display the lowest results of both WE and CEE countries 
that have been analyzed in this research.  
5.3. Classification of parliamentary activity preference of Baltic MEPs 
The following table depicts possible parliamentary activities orientations of the 
Baltic state MEPs based on the research by Bíró-Nagy (2016). The same type of 
classification used for WE and CEE is also utilized for classifying MEPs from Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. Additionally, each MEP has the activism index next to their name 
the first time they are mentioned in this section. 
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Table 5.2 Division of Baltic states MEPs into 4 types of parliamentary activities 
Policy–oriented Politics–type Politics/Policy oriented Neither 
Tarand Paet Kelam Grigule-Pēterse 
Zīle Auštrevičius Toom Pabriks 
 Balčytis Kalniete Saudargas 
 Blinkevičiūtė Kariņš  
 Guoga Tomaševski = 
 Mazuronis Uspaskich  
 Paksas   
 Ropė   
 Mamikins   
 
The MEPs that have a Policy-oriented profile are Tarand and Zīle. The next 
MEP in the group is Tarand (2,35), having above-average results in Opinions as a 
Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Written Declarations, Reports as a 
Rapporteur and Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur. It is noticeable that Tarand especially 
devotes time to parliamentary activities that are of policy-type (Bíró-Nagy 2016:6). The 
next MEP in the group is Zīle (0,85). He has above-average results in Opinions as a 
Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Reports as a Rapporteur and Reports as 
a Shadow Rapporteur. Zīle has a strong profile in the parliamentary activities that involve 
policy making. In this certain class MEPs representing Estonia and Latvia dominate, 
despite the fact that Latvia as a country does not show above-average results in any of 
the 9 parameters, however, Latvian representatives individually are showing better 
results than others when it comes to the important role in terms of the EP of being a 
Rapporteur.  
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The group of MEPs that have preference in terms of Politics-type activities 
mainly consist of Lithuanian representatives. The only Estonian MEP in the class is Paet 
(2,08), however, he has results above the EU average in Parliamentary Questions, 
Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, 
Reports as a Rapporteur and Reports Amended. Auštrevičius (1,59) has results that are 
above-average in Parliamentary Questions, Motions for Resolutions, Reports as a 
Rapporteur and Reports Amended. He has the highest results in the parameters of 
Motions for Resolutions and Reports Amended. Balčytis (1,75) expreses high levels of 
activism in Parliamentary Questions, Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary, 
Opinions as a Rapporteur, Written Declarations, Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and 
Reports Amended. Overall Balčytis express high levels of activism in almost all of the 9 
parameters, while focusing more on politics-type activities. The most active MEP among 
the Lithuanian delegation is Blinkevičiūtė (1,91). She expresses high levels of activism 
in Written Questions, Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary, Opinions as a 
Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Written Declarations and Reports 
Amended. Blinkevičiūtė has excellent results in all of the 9 parameters, mostly excelling 
in parameters that are in connection with political-type activities. Guoga (0,92) has 
results that are above the EU average in Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary 
and Written Declarations. He has the highest result in Speeches in the Plenary. Mazuronis 
(0,72) has results above the EU average in Motions for Resolutions and Speeches in the 
Plenary. The next Lithuanian MEP in the category is Paksas (1,51). His results above the 
EU average are in Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary, Opinions as a 
Shadow Rapporteur, Written Declarations and Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur. In total 
he shows the highest levels of activism in parliamentary activities that are of political-
type. Ropė (1,36) has results that are above the EU average in Parliamentary Questions, 
Motions for Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, 
Written Declarations, Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur and Reports Amended. Overall 
Ropė is a MEP that devotes his energy both for politics-type and policy-related 
parliamentary activities, but if statistically counted then he has devoted more time for 
politics-type activities. The only Latvian MEP in this group is Mamikins (1,05). He has 
results above the EU average in Parliamentary Questions, Speeches in the Plenary and 
Opinions as a Rapporteur. It is noticeable that Mamikins prefers more the political-type 
of parliamentary activities. Almost all of the MEPs in this group have devoted most of 
their time in the EP for tabling motions, which, according to the results, is the most 
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preferred political-type of activity not only by the MEPs of the Baltic states, but also for 
MEPs representing other CEE and WE countries.  
The class of MEPs in the Policy/Politics group consists of two Lithuanian, two 
Latvian and two Estonian representatives. This is also the second largest group with 
seven MEPs in it. Kelam (0.96) has results above the EU average in Motions for 
Resolutions, which shows preference for politics-type activities in the EP. Toom (1,06) 
shows results above the EU average in Opinions as a Rapporteur and Opinions as a 
Shadow Rapporteur. According to the results displayed in the Graph 5 (Chapter 4) she 
has outstanding results in Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur and has written a 
considerable amount of Opinions as a Rapporteur as well (see Graph 4 Chapter 4). Kariņš 
(0,55) has results above the EU average in Reports as a Rapporteur and Reports Amended 
and has a result close to the EU average in Written Declarations. The next Latvian MEP 
is Kalniete (0,46) she has results above the EU average in Motions for Resolutions and 
a close result to the EU average in Reports as a Rapporteur. Uspaskich (0,34) has results 
that are above the EU average in Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur. Tomaševski (0,28) 
has results above the EU average in Motions for Resolution. For MEPs representing this 
group there is in common that most of them have low rates in the activism measurement. 
The Neither group, which includes individuals that cannot be classified in the 
three aforementioned groups, consist of two Latvian and one Lithuanian representatives. 
From MEPs that started their mandate in 2014 the lowest results are displayed by 
Saudargas (0,19), Pabriks (0,36) and Grigule-Pēterse (0,03). From MEPs representing 
Latvia in the EP the least active MEP is Grigule-Pēterse. She only has results in some of 
the parliamentary activities that are policy-related (Parliamentary Questions, Motions for 
Resolutions, Speeches in the Plenary and Reports as a Shadow Rapporteur). Pabriks with 
activism of 0,36 has results closest to the EU average in Reports as a Rapporteur, Reports 
as a Shadow Rapporteur and Plenary Attendance. Overall, he shows the highest results 
in policy-type of parliamentary activities (Bíró-Nagy 2016:6). The least active MEP 
among MEPs that represent Lithuania is Saudargas. He has the result closest to the EU 
average in Speeches in the Plenary, while his lowest results are all politics-type.  
In conclusion, most of the Baltic MEPs devote their time for politics-type 
activities as not all of the MEPs are granted rapporteurship. MEPs of Lithuania are 
mostly devoting their time for parliamentary activities that are politics-type or both 
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politics/policy types, while among MEPs representing Latvia and Estonia most of the 
MEPs are devoting their time more for policy-related activities or neither. Some of the 
MEPs representing Latvia and Estonia also devote time for politics-type activities. The 
number of questions, speeches, amendments, opinions, written declarations and motions 
for resolutions, the respective coefficients are all statistically insignificant when it comes 
to the re-nomination of a MEP in the EP (Sigalas, Tiemann 2012:9). From this 
assumption it can be concluded that some of the parliamentary activities are more 
influential than others when it comes to possible re-nomination and those activities in 
many cases are also more time consuming, therefore MEPs that are focused more 
towards the policy-related activities tend to have lower results in political-type of 
activities. 
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6. Conclusions  
To the author’s knowledge, such research comparing all three Baltic states MEPs 
with regards to their activities in the EP is done for the first time. This was done by 
collecting all the data from the website that monitors the daily activities of MEPs in the 
EP – mepranking.eu. The MEPs are initially categorized by member state, and then the 
average of all member states is calculated. After the calculations for every member state 
are completed, the European Union average of member states is calculated for every 
parameter. The second part of calculations comes in the form of calculating the parameter 
averages of all MEPs. After that there is analysis for the 6 EU founding states and for 
CEE countries (including the three Baltic states) that joined the EU in 2004. Additionally, 
the activism of every MEP, as well as the EU average, is calculated. The measurement of 
activism is derived from a activism measurement formula.  
Among the 6 EU founding states the most active are MEPs from Belgium (1,36) 
and the least active are MEPs from Germany (0,56). From the CEE countries the most 
active MEPs are from Estonia (1,44) and the least active MEPs from Latvia (0,49). As 
according to the results of activism measurement for these two groups of countries it can 
be concluded that CEE MEPs are showing higher levels of activism than the 6 EU 
founding states MEPs.  
To display the average activism of the MEPs representing the Baltic states the 
average mark of the 9 parameters of all the MEPs was divided by the average mark of the 
MEPs of the Baltic states in a certain parameter. Therefore, in the result it was calculated 
that the most active MEPs from the Baltic states are representing Estonia, with 
respectively overall activism index 1,44, then follows Lithuania with 0,91 and the lowest 
activism was shown by MEPs representing Latvia with a result of 0,49. The least active 
MEP from Latvia is Grigule-Pēterse (0,03) and the most active is Mamikins (1,05). The 
least active MEP from Estonia is Kelam (0,96) and the most active MEP is Tarand (2,35). 
For Lithuania the lowest activism index rate has Saudargas (0,19) and the highest activism 
index rate shows Blinkevičiūtė (1,91). 
The third part of the empirical analysis employs parliamentary activities 
preferences of both CEE and WE countries and the Baltic states MEP as based on the 
research by Bíró-Nagy (2016). MEPs are divided into four groups of parliamentary 
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activities – policy-related, politics-type, politics/policy oriented and neither – as based on 
their results in 9 parliamentary activities: Reports as a Rapporteur, Reports as a Shadow 
Rapporteur, Opinions as a Rapporteur, Opinions as a Shadow Rapporteur, Reports 
Amended, Parliamentary Questions (PQs), Motions for Resolutions, Written 
Declarations and Speeches in the Plenary. As according to the results that are shown in 
the Chapter 4 from the CEE and WE countries devoting more time for policy-related 
activities are: Estonia, Italy, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic. CEE and WE 
countries that are devoting more time for politics-type of activities are: Belgium, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia. Countries that show results above the EU average in 
politics/policy type of parliamentary activities are France, The Netherlands, Hungary and 
Poland. Countries that have their results below the EU average in all parameters are: 
Latvia and Germany.  
Baltic State MEPs that are devoting their time more for policy-oriented 
activities are Tarand and Zīle. Baltic states MEPs that are more focusing on politics-type 
of parliamentary activities are Paet, Auštrevičius, Balčytis, Blinkevičiūtė, Guoga, 
Mazuronis, Paksas, Ropė and Mamikins. MEPs that have results above the EU average 
in politics/policy type of parliamentary activities are Kelam, Toom, Kalniete, Kariņš, 
Tomaševski and Uspaskich. MEPs that have in all of the 9 parameters results below the 
EU average are: Grigule-Pēterse, Pabriks and Saudargas.  
Overall most of the Baltic states MEPs are devoting their time for politics-type 
of parliamentary activities. The data shows that for Lithuania both country and most of 
individual MEP results are in the group of politics-type of parliamentary activities. 
Regarding Estonia it is visible that while country is in the group of Policy-oriented, only 
one Estonian is also in this group, while the 3 other MEPs are respectively represented 
in two other groups politics-type and politics/policy oriented. Latvia is grouped by 
parliamentary activities in the group of neither the same as two of MEPs representing 
Latvia in the EP are in this group. Latvia is the only one from the Baltic states that has 
MEPs in all of the 4 groups of parliamentary activities. 
The shortcomings of this research mainly are that it does not explain what is the 
reason behind MEPs preferences of certain parliamentary activities. The data only 
contains statistical calculations of parliamentary activities inside in the EP, but as Bíró-
Nagy (2016) mentions that also activities outside the EP can be measured equally in terms 
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of re-election of a MEP in the EP. There are also excluded other factors that could 
influence the overall activism of the MEPs of the Baltic states, such as age and experience 
in the EP. 
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